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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 This dissertation concentrates on income-related inequality in health care utilization and 
inequity in health care delivery systems of low and middle income (henceforth LMI) countries 
represented by Albania, Nepal, Tajikistan and Tanzania. Chapter 1 focuses on the introduction of 
research topics. Starting from the background of this research in section 1.1, this dissertation 
states the research problem in section 1.2 and defines research objectives in section 1.3. Section 
1.4 explains why this study is important at this moment. After a brief discussion of the study 
design in section 1.5, this chapter notes some limitations of this research in section 1.6. 
1.1 Background 
Many have argued that in matters of health and health care, the public attaches greater 
importance to the achievement of equity than to efficiency (MacLachlan and Maynard, 1982). 
This statement may be debatable because achieving equity by reducing inequality and 
maintaining efficiency in health care are both important for policy makers and governments. 
However, maintaining equity and reducing inequality in health care utilization is certainly a goal 
of the health care system in all or most of the countries of the world. For example; the World 
Health Report-1999 identifies six goals of health care systems for the development of its member 
states. One of these goals is to reduce health inequalities within and across the countries. 
Reducing inequality in health care utilization is therefore a matter of concern for policy makers 
and the government of low and middle-income countries and a matter of research for 
academicians and researchers of this field. 
In the last two decades many have studied (van Doorslaer et al, 1997, 2000; van 
Doorslaer and Masseria, 2004; Wagstaff and van Doorslaer, 1993; Wagstaff and van Doorslaer, 
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1997; Wagstaff, 2002; Lu et al, 2007) income-related inequality in health care utilization 
(IRIHCU), equity in health care delivery, equity in health care finance, and inequalities in health. 
Most have focused on calculation and interpretation of inequalities for high-income industrial 
countries. Very little (van Doorslaer and O’Donnell, 2008) has been done for LMI countries. 
This paper describes approaches to the measurement and explanation of income-related 
inequality and inequity in health care financing, health care utilization and health.  
  Similarly, other researchers such as Deaton (2002), Marmot (2002), Subramanian and 
Kawachi (2004), and Glied and Lleras-Muney (2008) focused their study on the relationship 
between income and health and income and education. For example, Deaton (2002) studied the 
relationship between income and mortality of the male population in the United States using the 
National Longitudinal Mortality Study (NLMS) data and concluded that men in the upper 5 
percent of the income distribution live 25 percent longer than those in the bottom 5 percent of the 
distribution.  Proportional increases in income are associated with equal proportional decreases 
in mortality throughout the income distribution.  
 Marmot (2002) argued that, other things being equal, a population with more equal 
distribution of income will have better health than another with the same average income but 
greater income inequality. The effect of education on health is more productive than income 
because it enhances the person’s health directly and indirectly by enhancing a person’s efficiency 
and then income. Subramanian and Kawachi (2004) established the inverse relationship between 
income inequality and population health. Glied and Lleras-Muney (2008) studied whether more 
educated people in the US benefit more than the less educated from technological advances in 
medicine and concluded that the better educated people get more benefits from technological 
advances in medicine and maintain better health. These studies imply that there is some 
3 
 
 
relationship between population health, income and education. All of these studies are confined 
to US data. 
  My study, however, focuses on LMI countries and tests whether increases in average 
income and education reduce inequality in health care utilization. Results show that the 
redistribution of income in favor of poor and education in favor of less educated reduces the 
inequality in health care utilization sustainably from LMI countries. Thus, my study further 
focuses on how LMI countries reduce inequality in income and education?  
  The language of health disparities is varied, and different terms have been used in 
different parts of the world. The term “disparity” is most widely used throughout the US and a 
“variation” is used in Great Britain. Likewise, the term “inequality” is widely used in Europe and 
elsewhere.  However, inequality and disparity are synonymously used throughout this 
dissertation.  
  The empirical literature in health care suffers from a lack of agreement about how to 
define disparities within and across groups. The dictionary defines disparity as a difference, 
which simply means two quantities are not equal. This provides a workable definition of health 
disparity. According to this simple definition, a disparity is just a difference. In this sense, the 
word disparity has the same meaning as the word inequality—two quantities are not equal. The 
Institute of Medicine (2002) defines disparity as: any difference in the use of health services after 
adjusting for preferences and health care needs. The National Institutes of Health (NIH) Strategic 
Plan to Reduce and Ultimately Eliminate Health Disparities 2001 defines health disparities in 
this way: “Health disparities are differences in the incidence, prevalence, mortality and burden of 
disease and other adverse health conditions that exist among specific population groups in the 
United States.” This definition simply means a disparity is a difference.  
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  By contrast, the Minority Health and Health Disparity Research and Education Act 2000 
states: “A population is a health disparity population if there is a ‘significant disparity’ in the 
overall rate of disease incidence, prevalence, morbidity, mortality or survival rates in the 
population as compared to the health status of general population.” The later definition, however, 
says that a disparity has to be significant when compared to the general population. Following 
these definitions, I define inequality in health care utilization as “any statistically significance 
differences in the use of health care services by the population,” and this definition of inequality 
is used for further research in this study.  
  The term inequality in health is different than the term inequity in health. Actually, 
inequalities in health are based upon observed differences on disparities on health. An example is 
whether poor pregnant women visit gynecologists less than the rich women even though both 
have equal needs during their pregnancy. Then we compare whether they visit on equal number 
of times in a given time frame. If they are different and those differences are statistically 
significant, then inequality exists, and a disparity exists. Inequities in health, on the other hand, 
are based on ethical judgments about the fairness of the differences.  Is it fair, for example, that 
poor pregnant women visit gynecologists less than the rich ones even though both have equal 
needs during their pregnancy? 
  Various methods such as range measures, unweighted regression-based measure, 
population-weighted regression-based measures, index of disparity, between group variance and 
disproportionality measures (Concentration Index, Theil Index, Mean Log Deviation and Gini 
Index) have been used for the measurement of inequality in health care utilization. Each of these 
methods has its relative strengths and weaknesses though all of those are legitimate methods for 
the calculation of inequality in health care utilization. I use the concentration index for the 
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measurement of income-related inequality in health care utilization (IRIHCU) and horizontal 
inequality index for the measurement of inequity proposed by Wagstaff and van Doorslaer 
(2000). Finally, I develop the relationship between IRIHCU and the covariates of health care use 
function to estimate the effect of increasing average value of each covariate on IRIHCU. Thus, 
my study is fundamentally different than the existing studies of this field on the following 
ground. My study proposes the measure — which can simply be defined as the policy effect of 
disparity in health care utilization — to estimate the effect of policy change on disparity in health 
care utilization. Accordingly, this study measures the effect of average increase in income and 
education on disparity in health care utilization. 
1.2 Statement of Problem 
Over the last three decades, most of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) countries, except the United States, have achieved close to universal 
coverage of their population for the majority of health care services. However, they have often 
adopted very different mixes of public and private financing and delivery of services, and there is 
a growing body of evidence showing that, despite such universal coverage, not all population 
groups are treated equally even though they are in equal need (van Doorslaer, E., et al, 2000).  
For example, the concentration indices which measure the inequality in health care 
utilization for visits to a general physician (GP) and a medical specialist combined are negative 
(pro-poor) for all countries except Sweden. When standardized for age, gender and the dummy 
or vector for chronic conditions the horizontal inequality indices are insignificant for most of the 
countries except Finland, East Germany, the Netherlands and the United States. For those four 
countries, delivery of health care services is pro-rich, (i.e., skewed toward the rich) (van 
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Doorslaer, E., et al, 2000). Despite having universal coverage, OECD countries have been facing 
inequalities in health care utilization and inequity in health care delivery. 
 However, the scenario of health care financing is quite different in LMI countries 
represented by Albania, Nepal, Tajikistan and Tanzania. The contribution of out-of-pocket 
expenditure on health in the year 2006 was 96.6 percent in Albania, 72.4 percent in Nepal, 95.1 
percent in Tajikistan and 65.1 percent in Tanzania (see Table 3 in Chapter 2). The remainder is 
either funded by donors or by the respective governments of those countries. In such health care 
financing model, better income people get better access to health care services. There may be 
very high inequality in health care utilization and inequity in health care delivery systems in LMI 
countries. Thus, it is interesting to study whether there is inequality in health care utilization and 
inequity in health care delivery systems of LMI countries? If yes, what are the determinants of 
inequality in health care utilization? 
 In the economic growth literature, human capital is almost universally regarded as 
indispensible for growth. Sustained growth depends on levels of human capital whose stocks 
increase as a result of higher education, better health and new learning and training procedures. 
Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992) raise the importance of considering health and nutrition in a 
broad analysis of human capital. Then Fogel (1994), Barro (1996) and Barro and Sala-i-Martin 
(2004) examines the relationship between economic growth and population health. The major 
message of each of these works is: good health raises levels of human capital and has a positive 
effect on individual productivity. That could ultimately enhance economic growth. Better health 
increases workforce productivity by reducing incapacity, debility, and the number of days lost to 
sick leave, and increases the opportunities an individual has of obtaining better paid work. 
Further, good health helps to forge improved levels of education by increasing levels of 
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schooling and scholastic performance. There is also an important positive spillover effect, (i.e., 
the resources that would otherwise be used for preventive health treatments are freed for 
alternative usages or in cushioning the effects of other negative externalities such as poverty 
within the nation). 
 Xavier Sala-i-Martin, (2005) examines the health-poverty trap and argues that low 
income tends to cause poor health and poor health, in turn, tends to cause low income. This two 
way causation generates a trap that one may well call the health-poverty trap. This trap has tragic 
consequences because poverty cannot be eradicated without dealing with the health issues of the 
poor, and these health problems, in turn, will not be fully solved until poverty is eradicated. In 
other words, health and poverty form a vicious circle from which it may be very difficult to 
escape. In that sense, good population health plays a very important role in the eradication of 
poverty in LMI countries.  
  As discussed in the previous two paragraphs, good health helps to reduce poverty and 
promote economic growth in LMI countries. To maintain good health of the population, LMI 
countries have to reduce inequity in the delivery of health care services and inequality in health 
care utilization among other things that affect human health. Thus, this research identifies the 
sustainable policy(s) to reduce disparity in health care utilization in LMI countries represented 
by Albania, Nepal, Tajikistan and Tanzania.  
This dissertation answers the following research questions: (1) Is there inequality in 
health care utilization in LMI countries represented by Albania, Nepal, Tajikistan and Tanzania? 
(2) Is the principle of “Equal Treatment for Equal Need (ETEN)” fulfilled in those countries? (3) 
What are the determinants of inequality in health care utilization in those countries? and (4) Do 
the sectoral policies such as average increase in income and/or education reduce inequality in 
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health care utilization sustainably in LMI countries? (5) If not, have LMI countries implemented 
the integrated approach of development to overcome that problem? 
1.3 Research Objectives 
 The major objective of this research is to identify the sustainable policy(s) to overcome 
the disparity in health care utilization in LMI countries represented by Albania, Nepal, Tajikistan 
and Tanzania. Other specific objectives are: 
(1) to calculate the inequality in health care utilization in LMI countries represented by Albania, 
Nepal, Tajikistan and Tanzania. 
(2) to calculate the horizontal inequality indices and test whether the principle of ETEN is 
fulfilled in those countries. 
(3) to decompose the inequality into the covariates of health care use functions. 
(4) to identify the sustainable policy(s) for the reduction of inequality in health care utilization in 
LMI countries. 
1.4 Significance of Study 
As stated in section 1.1, in the last two decades many have studied income-related 
inequality in health care utilization (IRIHCU), equity in health care delivery, equity in health 
care finance, and inequalities in health. Most have focused on calculation and interpretation of 
inequalities for high-income industrial countries. All of those studies proposed various methods 
of measurement of inequality in health care utilization, health care financing and health care 
delivery. Very little (van Doorslaer, E. and O’Donnell, O., 2008) has been done for LMI 
countries. Thus, a similar study of calculation and decomposition of income-related inequality in 
health care utilization is useful for the development of an appropriate health care system and 
formulation of health care policy of LMI countries.  
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In contrast, Wagstaff, van Doorslaer and Watanabe (2003), show that the total changes in 
income-related inequality in health care use are attributed to the changes in the means, 
inequalities and effects of the determinants of health care use. However, they do not discuss at all 
whether the average increase in the covariates of health care use function reduces income-related 
inequalities in health care utilization. Further, do increases sustainably reduce IRIHCU in LMI 
countries? In this regard, my study differs from the existing literature. Unlike the other literature 
of this field, I develop and propose a formula to estimate the effect of average increase in each 
covariate of health care use function on IRIHCU. I define that effect as “policy effect of health 
care inequality”. Thus, this study clearly answers questions that are not answered by the existing 
literature of this field.  
1.5 Study Design 
As discussed in the previous sub-sections, Chapter 1 focuses on the background and 
precisely states the problems that have to be address by this research. It also establishes the 
significance of my research. Chapter 2 presents and compares the existing socio-economic 
conditions, health indicator variables, and existing growth and poverty situation of the countries 
under study represented by Albania, Nepal, Tajikistan and Tanzania. Chapter 3 briefly reviews 
the relevant literatures. Chapter 4 outlines the detail method used for this study. Chapter 5 
calculates and decomposes the IRIHCU and measures the effect of average increase in income 
and education on IRIHCU. Likewise, Chapter 6 identifies the causes of inequality in income and 
education and recommends the appropriate policy measures to reduce those inequalities 
sustainably from LMI countries. Finally, Chapter 7 briefly discusses the conclusions and 
recommendations of this study. 
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1.6 Study Limitations 
Despite the role of income, education, need-based factors and other factors that are 
considered in this study in utilization of health care services (physician services), we cannot 
ignore the effect of the out-of-pocket price paid for health care services on health care utilization 
because out-of-pocket financing is the major source of health care financing in all countries 
under my study. However, to measure the effect of price change on disparity on health care 
utilization, we need sufficient data and information related to the price paid for health care 
services and drugs. Lack of such data creates severe limitation in measuring the effect of pricing 
policy on disparity in health care utilization in LMI countries. 
 Likewise, the out-of-pocket financing for education has been a large proportion of the 
cost of education in the countries under study. This suggests that schooling is likely affected by 
the price of education services and the price of related goods such as health. Again, the limitation 
of data related to out-of-pocket price paid for schooling and other services such as health 
prevents studying the effect of price control on disparity on education. 
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Chapter 2 
Country Profiles  
Chapter 1 focuses on the background of the study and raises some serious questions that 
should be addressed to reduce inequality in health care utilization in LMI countries represented 
by Albania, Nepal, Tajikistan and Tanzania. However, Chapter 2 answers the question why my 
research selects only Albania, Nepal, Tajikistan and Tanzania to represent the LMI countries.  
Section 2.1 fundamentally focused on the modalities of the study area selection, and section 2.2 
briefly discusses the health care systems and expenditure patterns of these countries.  
2.1 Modalities of Study Area Selection 
Albania is a middle income country and Nepal, Tajikistan, and Tanzania are low income 
countries. Some of the development indicators of those countries are depicted in Table 1.  
Table 1: Some Development Indicators 
      Indicators Albania Nepal Tajikistan Tanzania USA 
      
GDP Growth (Annual %) 3.50 4.60 3.80 6.98 3.00 
GDP per capita, PPP (constant 2005 
international $) 
 
$7667.40 $1075.40 $19401.00 $1285.60 $42297.07 
Poverty headcount ratio at $1.25 a day 
(PPP) (% of population) 
 
62.00% 55.12% 21.49% 67.87% 0.00% 
Poverty headcount ratio at national 
poverty line (% of population) 
 
12.40% 30.90% 53.10% 33.40% 0.00% 
GNI per capita, PPP (current 
international $) 
 
8640.00 1180.00 1950.00 1360.00 47360.00 
Urban Population (% of total) 49.00% 17.00% 26.00% 25.00% 82.30% 
Source: The World Bank, June, 5, 2011 and Kaiser Family Foundation, June 5, 2011. 
Note: USA: United States of America. 
 
Very Low Per Capita GDP and Low Growth:  Comparing the GDP per capita measured 
at PPP constant 2005 international dollar, Albania has 5.67 times less GDP per capita than that of 
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the US whereas Nepal has 40.34 times less. Even though the GDP growth rate of Albania, Nepal, 
Tajikistan and Tanzania is better than that of the US, the US growth of 3 percent comes from a 
base of $12703.5, billion whereas the growths of other countries are from much smaller bases. 
Thus, the true growth amount in all countries under study is far less than that in the US. Further, 
other developing countries such as India and China have a much higher growth rate (9.1% in 
2009) than that of the countries under study.  
Very High Absolute Poverty: The poverty head count ratios at the national poverty line 
are highest in Tajikistan followed by Tanzania, Nepal and Albania (Table 1).  Compared with the 
World Bank benchmark of $1.25 per person per day measured at PPP, we can note a hooping 
increase in poverty (Table 1) in all countries.  
Distinct Dual Economy: Each of the countries has a distinct dual economy. In Albania 
approximately one half of the population (Table 1) lives in urban areas. Unlike the trends in 
Albania, almost one-fourth of the populations are urban in low income countries represented by 
Tajikistan and Tanzania (Table 1). Lowest among all, Nepal has only 17 percent of the 
population residing in cities. In contrast, more than 82 percent of the population lives in urban 
areas in the United States. 
High Mortality, Low Life Expectancy and Poor Health Status: Table 2 depicts and 
compares the general health status of the population in LMI countries represented by Albania, 
Nepal, Tajikistan and Tanzania to that of the United States. Out of 1,000 live births, the death 
rate of each LMI country exceeds that of the United States in the year 2011 (Table 2). The 
highest and the lowest rate of life expectancy at birth for a male is 72 years in Albania and 53 
years in Tanzania. Nepal and Tajikistan are in between. Likewise, the population growth rate of 
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all low income countries is higher than that of middle income and high income countries 
represented respectively by Albania and the United States (Table 2).  
Latest Data Base is Available to Those Countries: Last but not least, recent data sets are 
available for these countries. This research uses the living standard and measurement survey 
(LSMS) data for Albania 2005, Nepal 2004, Tajikistan 2007 and Tanzania 2004. For other LMI 
countries, it is hard to find such a fresh data set.  
Table 2: Demography and Population 
Indicators Date Type of Data Albania Nepal Tajik Tanza USA 
Birth Rate 2011 Rate per 1,000 12.15 22.17 26.29 32.64 13.83 
Total Fertility Rate 2011 Number 1.48 2.47 2.89 4.16 2.06 
Death Rate 2011 Rate per 1,000 6.15 6.81 6.60 12.09 8.38 
Infant Mortality Rate  2011 Rate per 1,000 14.61 44.54 38.54 66.93 6.06 
Under-Age 5 Mortality 
Rate 
2010 Rate per 1,000 18.00 50.00 63.00 76.00 8.00 
Maternal Mortality Ratio 2008 
Rate per 
100,000 
31.00 380.00 64.00 790.00 24.00 
Life Expectancy - Female 2009 Number 75.00 69.00 69.00 58.00 81.00 
Life Expectancy - Male 2009 Number 72.00 65.00 66.00 53.00 76.00 
Population Growth Rate 2011 % 0.27% 1.60% 1.85% 2.00% 0.96% 
Source:  Kaiser Family Foundation, Country Data Downloaded on March 31, 2012.  
Note: USA: United States of America, Tajik.: Tajikistan and Tanza.:  Tanzania.    
(URL: - http://www.globalhealthfacts.org/index.jsp) 
Because of the existence of the above-stated similarities, Albania, Nepal, Tajikistan and 
Tanzania have some common comparable socio-economic and demographic status. In such 
circumstances, it could be interesting to compare and interpret the inequality in health care 
utilization in these countries. Thus, the current study calculates and interprets the inequality in 
health care utilization and identifies the determinants of those inequalities for each country by 
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using decomposition analysis proposed in Chapter 4. Finally, it designs some sustainable policies 
to reduce that disparity from the LMI countries under study.  
2.2 Health Care System and Expenditures  
Albania: Albania a middle-income country located in southeastern Europe on the Balkan 
Peninsula.  The annual total health expenditure of the country was 6.8 percent of GDP in 2008 
where public and private funding sources accounted for 39.4 percent and 60.6 percent 
respectively. About 96.6 percent of private health financing in Albania was through out-of 
pocket household expenditure. Social security contributes 38.2 percent of the expenditure, which 
is the highest among the four countries under study and higher than that of the United States 
(Table 3). 
Table 3: Program Funding and Financing in 2008 
Indicators Albania Nepal Tajikistan Tanzania U.S. 
Health Expenditure Per Capita at PPP $569.00  $66.00  $95.00  $57.00  $7164.00 
Total Expenditure on Health  6.80% 6.00% 5.00% 4.50% 15.20% 
Government Health Expenditure as Percent 
of Total Government  
8.20% 11.30% 5.00% 18.00% 18.70% 
Government Health Expenditure as Percent 
of Total Health 
39.40% 37.70% 27.70% 72.30% 47.80% 
Private Expenditure on Health 60.60% 62.30% 72.30% 27.70% 52.20% 
External Resources for Health 2.10% 11.00% 10.50% 59.50% 0.00% 
Social Security Expenditure on Health 38.20% 0.00% 0.00% 3.30% 27.80% 
Out-of-Pocket Expenditure on Health 96.60% 72.40% 95.10% 65.10% 24.40% 
Source: - Kaiser Family Foundation, Country Data Downloaded in March 31, 2012.  
Note: USA: United States of America, Tajik.: Tajikistan and Tanza.:  Tanzania.    
(URL:- http://www.globalhealthfacts.org/index.jsp) 
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 The state is the major provider of health services, health promotion, prevention, 
diagnosis and treatment in Albania (Albania Demographic and Health Survey, 2008-09). The 
private sector, which is still developing, covers most of the pharmaceutical and dental services, 
as well as some clinics for highly specialized diagnosis, mostly in the capital of Tirana and one 
or two other major cities. Diagnostic and curative health services in Albania are organized in 
three levels: primary health care, secondary hospital services, and tertiary hospital services. The 
second level of health care is basically provided by hospitals. There are over forty public 
hospitals in the country, including 22 District Hospitals, 11 Regional Hospitals, 4 University 
Hospitals, 1 University Trauma Centre, 2 Psychiatric Hospitals, and 1 National Centre for Child 
Development and Growth. The number of physicians, nurses and midwives, and hospital beds 
available per 10,000 patients in the years 2000-2010 were respectively 12, 40 and 29 (Table 4).  
Other demographic and population indicators are presented in Table 2 above. 
Nepal: Nepal is one of the low-income countries in South Asia. The total expenditure on 
health as percentage of GDP was 6.0 percent in 2008. Of the total, contribution of government 
health expenditure was 37.7 percent and private sectors contribution was 62.3 percent. About 
72.4 percent of private health financing in Nepal was through out-of pocket household 
expenditure. However, the social security contribution to health expenditure was zero in 2008.  
Health services in Nepal are basically provided by government and private sectors and 
quasi-public agencies such as non-governmental organizations (NGOs). There are 94 hospitals, 5 
health centers, 699 health posts, 293 ayurvedic hospitals, 3104 sub-health posts and 201 primary 
health centers spread all over the country. The number of physicians, nurses and midwives, 
community health workers and hospital beds available per 10,000 patients in the years 2000-
2010 are presented in Table 4. For example, the number of physicians available per 10,000 
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population in Nepal is 2 which is greater than that in Tanzania and far less than that in Albania, 
Tajikistan and the US (Table 4). Demographic and other health indicators of Nepal are presented 
in Table 2 above. 
Table 4: Health Workforce and Capacity from 2000-2010 
Indicators 
Type of 
Data 
Albania Nepal Tajik Tanza. USA 
Physicians  
Rate per 
10,000 
12.00 2.00 20.00 <1.00 27.00 
Nurses and Midwives 
Rate per 
10,000 
40.00 5.00 50.00 2.00 98.00 
Community Health 
Workers  
Rate per 
10,000 
NA 6.00 NA NA NA 
Births Attended by 
Skilled Health Personnel 
% 99.00% 19.00% 88.00% 51.00% 99.00% 
Hospital Beds  
Rate per 
10,000 
29.00 50.00 61.00 11.00 31.00 
Source:- Kaiser Family Foundation, Country Data Downloaded on March 31, 2012. 
Note: USA: United States of America, Tajik.: Tajikistan and Tanza.:  Tanzania.    
(URL:- http://www.globalhealthfacts.org/index.jsp) 
Tajikistan: Tajikistan, one of the former Soviet republics, declared its independence in 
September 1991 after the breakup of the USSR. Total expenditure on health as percentage of 
GDP was 5.0 percent in 2008 where the share of public sources was 27.7 percent and that of 
private was 72.3 percent. Out-of-pocket expenditure contributes to 95.1 percent of the private 
health expenditure. The per capita health expenditure in 2008 was US$ 95 at PPP; this was 
greater than that of Nepal and Tanzania. 
The delivery of health care services is divided among four administrative levels: national 
(republican), regional (oblast), district (rayon) and village. The Ministry of Health runs national-
level institutions, and local administrations run other health care services. In rural areas, primary 
care is delivered through nurse posts, rural physician clinics, and small rural hospitals. In urban 
areas, primary and secondary care is delivered by polyclinics, basic secondary care by district 
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(rayon) hospitals, specialized secondary care in regional (oblast or city) hospitals, and more 
complex care in national hospitals. The health care system is hospital centered, and treatment in 
hospital with long inpatient stays is more common. There were 20 physicians, 50 nurses and 
midwives, and 61 hospital beds per 10,000 patients in the years 2000-2010 (Table 4). 
Demographic and population health indicators of Tajikistan are presented in Table 2 above. 
Tanzania: The United Republic of Tanzania is the largest country in East Africa. The 
annual total health expenditure of the country was 4.5 percent of GDP in the year 2008. Of the 
total health expenditure, 72.3 percent was financed by public sources, and the remaining 27.7 
percent was by private funding sources.  About 65.1 percent of private health financing in 
Tanzania was through out-of pocket household expenditure, which is lowest among the countries 
under study. Social security contributed 3.3 percent of the expenditure. The external sources 
contribute 59.5 percent of the total health care expenditure, which was the highest among the 
four countries under study (Table 2). 
There are five levels of facilities in the public health system: national referral hospitals, 
regional general hospitals, district hospitals, health centers, and dispensaries. In Zanzibar, the 
lowest level facilities are cottage hospitals referred to as primary health care units (PHCUs), 
rather than dispensaries. In 2006 there were 5,379 health facilities in Tanzania Mainland and 146 
facilities in Zanzibar. Table 4 shows the number of physicians, nurses and midwifes and hospital 
beds available in Tanzania from 2000-2010. Demographic and population health indicators of 
Tanzania are presented in Table 2 above. Kagera, a major populous region in Tanzania, is 
assumed to have similar leading health indicators and health system. 
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Chapter 3 
Literature Review  
Chapter 2 answers the question why my research focused only on LMI countries 
represented by Albania, Nepal, Tajikistan and Tanzania and briefly discusses the profile of each 
country under study. Chapter 3 reviews the literature associated with this study. This chapter is 
classified into four sub-sections. Sub-section 3.1 briefly reviews the literature of income-related 
inequality in health and health care utilization, whereas the literature related to education and 
income inequality are reviewed respectively in sub-section 3.2 and 3.3. Finally, sub-section 3.4 
briefly reviews the literature related to inequality and growth. 
3.1 Inequality in Health and Health Care Utilization 
In the last two decades many have studied income-related inequality in health care 
utilization (IRIHCU), equity in health care delivery, equity in health care finance and inequalities 
in health. Starting from 1991, some of the interesting literature that is related to the measurement 
and decomposition of income-related inequality in health care utilization are reviewed in 
chronological order in the following paragraphs. 
Wagstaff A. et al (1991) published a paper on the measurement of inequalities in health. 
The primary objectives of this paper were: (1) to provide a critical review of the various 
measures of inequality that had been employed in the literature on inequalities in health to 1991 
and (2) to identify which measures are best suited to measure health inequality. This paper 
identified the six measures of inequality, namely: (a) the range, (b) the Gini coefficient (and the 
associated Lorenz curve), (c) a pseudo-Gini coefficient (and an associated pseudo-Lorenz curve), 
(d) the index of dissimilarity, (e) the slope index of inequality (and the associated relative index 
of inequality) and (f) the concentration index (and the associated concentration curve). Finally, it 
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recommends the slope index of inequality and the concentration index for the study of 
socioeconomic inequality in health because those measures meet the minimal requirements of an 
inequality measure. It reflects the socioeconomic dimension of inequalities in health. Actually, it 
reflects the experiences of the entire population (rather than just, say, social classes I and III); 
and it is sensitive to changes in the distribution of the population across socioeconomic groups. 
The secondary objective of this paper was to demonstrate the importance of having a 
reliable measure of inequality in comparative studies of inequalities in health. Comparing the 
results of the slope index of inequality and the concentration index with that of the range 
measure and pseudo-Lorenz curve for cross-country comparison, this paper concludes that the 
first two measures give more reliable and desirable results than the latter two. Following the 
conclusion of this paper, various researchers have been using the concentration index for the 
measurement and cross-country comparison of inequality in health. Indeed, my current research 
is also based on the same method for the calculation of income-related inequality in physician 
service utilization. 
Kakwani N. et al (1997) clarified the relationship between two widely used indices of 
health inequality namely: the relative index of inequality (RII) and the concentration index (CI) 
and explained why these are superior to the other indices used in the literature. For example, the 
CI is sensitive to socioeconomic dimension of inequalities in health because its value lies 
between -1 to 1. A positive CI represents the pro-rich and a negative CI represents pro-poor 
inequality in health. However, this sensitivity to the socioeconomic dimension of inequalities in 
health is not a feature of several other indices used in the literature such as the Gini coefficient, 
the index of dissimilarity and the index of inequality.  
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As the indices of health inequalities are generally estimated from sample observations, it 
is useful to test whether any observed differences in their values are statistically significant. 
Accordingly, this paper developed an accurate distribution-free asymptotic estimator of the 
standard errors of both the RII and CI. There is extensive literature on the sampling properties of 
Gini index to which the concentration index is related (Nygord and Sanstom, 1981; Kakwani, 
1990; Cowell, 1989). These sampling distributions were derived by applying Hoeffdyng’s (1948) 
theorem on order statistics. However, the same methodology cannot be applied to derive the 
sampling distribution of CIs because they can be both negative and positive and, therefore, 
cannot be written in the form of order statistics. Thus, the derivations of the standard error 
formulae of this paper were new, providing more general results. My study uses the same 
method proposed by this paper for the calculation of CI and its 95 percent confidence interval. 
Wagstaff A. et al (2003) used Vietnam Living Standards Surveys (VLSS) data in 1993 
and 1998 and decomposed the inequalities in height-for-age in Vietnam into its covariates. Then, 
their study identified the causes of changes in those inequalities from 1993 to 1998. The authors 
showed that inequalities across the income distribution in a variable y can be decomposed into 
their causes, and changes in inequality in y can be decomposed into the effects of changes in the 
means and inequalities in the determinants of y, and changes in the effects of the determinants of 
y. Their study suggested that inequalities in height-for-age in Vietnam in 1993 and 1998 largely 
accounted for inequalities in consumption and unobserved commune-level influences. Rising 
inequalities largely accounted for increases in average consumption and its protective effect, and 
rising inequality and general improvements at the commune level. 
For the decomposition of inequality in health care utilization, I use the method proposed 
by this study. However, unlike their measure of causes of changes in inequality, I propose a new 
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measure called policy effect of inequality to quantify the effect of policy change on income-
related inequality in health care utilization. 
Van Doorslaer E. et al (2004) updated and extended their previous study on equity in 
physician service utilization for a subset of the countries analyzed by van Doorslaer, Koolman 
and Puffer, (2002). This paper updated the results of 2000 for 13 countries and added new results 
for eight countries: Australia, Finland, France, Hungary, Mexico, Norway, Switzerland and 
Sweden. This study used the seventh wave of the European Community Household Panel 
(ECHP), Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS) for US and National Health Survey (ABS) 
for Australia. A list of data sources for other countries is given in Table 1 of their research paper.  
To measure the extent to which adults in equal need for physician care appear to have 
equal rates of medical care utilization, the authors used both simple quintile distributions and 
concentration indices. Their result showed the pro-poor inequity in physician service utilization. 
However, after controlling for need a significant pro-rich inequity was noted in about half of the 
countries, both for the probability and the total number of physician visits. The degree of pro-
rich inequity in doctor use is highest in the US, followed by Mexico, Finland, Portugal and 
Sweden. 
Van Doorslaer E. et al (2006) studied the inequalities in access to medical care by income 
in developed countries for the OECD Health Equity Research Group.  Using data from national 
surveys and European Community Household Panel, the authors generated the number of visits 
to a general practitioner or medical specialist over the recall period of one year. The inequity in 
doctor’s service delivery was then calculated using horizontal inequity (HI) index. It is simply a 
concentration index of the need-standardized use. The doctor’s visits were standardized for need 
differences using age, sex and reported health levels as proxies. 
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Their results showed the pro-rich inequity in physician service utilization in about half of 
the OECD countries. The degree of pro-rich inequity in doctor use was highest in the US and 
Mexico, followed by Finland, Portugal and Sweden. However, in other countries, evidence of 
inequity in the distribution of general practitioner visits across income groups was not apparent. 
In some cases the evidence of pro-poor inequity was also identified. After controlling for need 
differences, their result showed that people with higher incomes are significantly more likely to 
see a specialist than people with lower incomes and, in most countries, also more frequently. 
Pro-rich inequity was especially large in Portugal, Finland and Ireland. 
Jui-fen R. Lu et al (2007) studied the horizontal inequity in the health care utilization for 
the health care delivery system of Hong Kong, South Korea and Taiwan. Using the Thematic 
Household Survey (2002) for Hong Kong, National Health and Nutrition Survey (1998) for 
South Korea and National Health Interview Survey (2001) for Taiwan, the authors compared the 
extent to which the principle of ‘‘equal treatment for equal need’’(ETEN) was maintained in the 
health care delivery systems of Hong Kong, South Korea and Taiwan. Deviations in the degree 
to which health care was distributed according to need were then measured by an index of 
horizontal inequity. Income-related inequality in utilization was then decomposed into four 
major sources: (i) direct effect of income; (ii) need indicators (self-assessed health status, activity 
limitation, and age and gender interaction terms); (iii) non-need variables (education, work 
status, private health insurance coverage, employer-provided medical benefits, Medicaid status 
(low-income medical assistance), geographic region and urban/rural residency and (iv) a residual 
term.  
Their study calculated the inequality in western doctor visits, licensed traditional 
medicine practitioner (LTMP) visits, dental and emergency room (ER) visits, as well as inpatient 
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admissions. Their result identified that the principle of ETEN was violated for physician and 
dental services utilization in Hong Kong. Further, a pro-rich inequity was detected in western 
doctor visits. Unusually, this inequity existed for general practitioner but not specialist care. In 
contrast, South Korea appears to have almost comprehensively maintained ETEN although the 
better-off had preferential access to higher levels of outpatient care. Taiwan shows intermediate 
results in that the rich were marginally more likely to use outpatient services, but quantities of 
western doctor and dental visits were evenly distributed while there was modest pro-rich bias in 
the number of LTMP episodes. ER visits and inpatient admissions in Taiwan were either 
proportional or slightly pro-poor.  
Sara Allian (2008) systematically investigates the equity in health care use across 
Canadian Provinces. Using Canadian Community Health Survey 2003 data, she calculated the 
income related inequality by using concentration index and inequity using indirect 
standardization approach for probability, total and conditional number of general practitioner 
(GP), specialist, hospital and dentist visits. Results of this research showed some variation in 
inequity across provinces; however national trends showed pro-rich inequity in the probability of 
a general practitioner, specialist and dentist visits, and no significant evidence of inequity in 
inpatient care. Further, the main socio-economic factors associated with inequity were education, 
complementary insurance for prescription drugs and dental care and, in some cases, region of 
residence. 
Van Doorslaer E. and O’Donnell O. (2008) conducted research for United Nations 
University-World Institute for Development Economic Research. Their discussion paper- 
measurement and explanation of inequality in health and health care in low-income settings- 
described approaches to the measurement and explanation of income-related inequality and 
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inequity in health care financing, health care utilization and health. It considered the applicability 
and the feasibility of these methods in low-income countries. Like other studies that were done 
for industrial countries, this study as well used the concentration index for the measurement of 
inequality in health and health care utilization and horizontal inequity index for the measurement 
of inequity even though application of this method suffered from the sufficient data. Their next 
issue was the reliability issue of a self-access health measure in low-income countries. However, 
reliability issues could also be a problem in self reported date even in developed world. The only 
difference is on the degree of reliability due to the wide disparity that exists in education between 
the industrial and developing world.  
Deaton (2002) studied the relationship between income and population health.  This 
study is based on the National Longitudinal Mortality Study (NLMS) merged data from death 
records with responses from household surveys around 1980. The major finding of his study 
was: men in the United States with family incomes in the top 5 percent of the distribution in 
1980 had about 25 percent longer to live than did those in the bottom 5 percent. Proportional 
increases in income were associated with equal proportional decreases in mortality throughout 
the income distribution. He discusses the possible reasons for this gradient and asked whether it 
calls for the redistribution of income in the interest of public health. In this paper Deaton argued 
that the existence of the gradient strengthens the case for income redistribution in favor of the 
poor but that targeting health inequalities would not be the sound policy. 
He further argued that policy cannot be intelligently conducted without an understanding 
of mechanisms; correlations are not enough. Thus, a solid mechanism can clearly establish the 
relationship among inequality in health care utilization; income and education could be very 
useful for the appropriate policy formulation to reduce inequality in health care utilization. My 
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study thus proposes a measure of the policy effect of disparity in health care utilization. It 
establishes the mechanism of how policy change affects disparity in health care use and tests 
whether increase in average income and education reduce income-related inequality in health 
care use. 
Some argue that the correlation of health with income is induced by the effects of 
education on income. Many economic models of health such as Grossman (1972) view education 
as enhancing a person’s efficiency as a producer of health. Although this is suggestive, it is not 
explicit about the mechanisms involved. The empirical evidence, on the other hand, shows that 
education protects health. Evidence from a range of rich countries shows that an additional year 
of education reduces mortality rates (at all ages) around 8 percent (I. Elo and S.H. Preston, 
1996).  
From that evidence, it is clear that income and education either separately or jointly affect 
population health and health care use. To understand how the changes in income and education 
affect inequality in health and health care utilization, we need a well-defined mechanism to 
establish the relationship among three. Thus, a solid mechanism can clearly establish the 
relationship among inequality in health care utilization, income and education could be very 
useful for the appropriate policy formulation to reduce inequality in health care utilization.  
Unlike the existing studies, my study thus proposes a measure of the policy effect of 
disparity in health care utilization. It establishes the mechanism of how policy change affects 
disparity in health care use and tests whether increase in average income and education reduce 
income related inequality in health care use (IRIHCU).  
3.2 Inequality in Education 
As education is the major source of human capital formation and the propeller of 
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economic growth, it helps to establish an egalitarian-based society and to reduce poverty. 
However, inequality in education contributes to inequalities in income, health care utilization and 
health that ultimately increases poverty, retards the rate of human capital formation and 
economic growth. Thus, the study of inequality in education for low and middle income (LMI) 
countries which have been suffering from low growth and wide spread poverty is very useful 
from policy and research perspectives. 
Some studies have been done on the measurement of inequality in education. A few of 
them used the Gini coefficient for the measurement of educational inequality.  Education Ginis, 
which are similar to the income Gini, is ranges from 0 to 1. A Gini coefficient with value zero 
implies perfect equality, and one implies perfect inequality. Education Gini coefficients can be 
calculated using enrollment, financing or attainment data.   
Maas and Criel (1982) estimated Gini coefficients based on enrollment data for 16 East 
African countries. First, they found that the degree of inequality in education opportunity varied 
enormously from one country to another. Second, enrollment Gini coefficients were negatively 
related to the average enrollment rate in a country. In other words, the higher the average 
enrollment, the lower the inequality.  
Ter Weele (1975) estimated Gini coefficients using education finance data for several 
East African countries. Rosthal (1978) summarized four indicators for the distribution of 
education estimated for the US and Gini index was one of them. Sheret (1982 and 1988) 
estimated the Gini coefficient of enrollment for Papua New Guinea. However, the  above-
mentioned  Ginis  were  calculated  based  on  enrollment  or  education  financing,  not  on  the 
distribution of school attainment.  
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Birdsall and Londoño (1997) used the standard deviation of years of education as an 
index for inequality in education. This study identified a negative correlation between the index 
and the rate of economic growth.  
Thomas, Wang, and Fan (2001) calculated the Gini coefficient from educational panel 
data provided by Barro and Lee (1993) and compared inequalities in education in eighty-five 
countries. This study uses data that can be compared internationally, but the data for education 
levels lacks adequate specificity for making comparisons between countries. The strictness of 
this analysis is thus limited.  
Filmer (2005) used the ratio of the average enrollment of males and females, and the ratio 
of the average enrollment of children from the richest 50% of households and the poorest 50% of 
households (with corresponding measures for attainment) for the measurement of gender and 
wealth disparity in schooling. Using ratios ensured a relative measure, and the comparison of the 
richest to poorest 50% ensured comparability between gender and wealth. He used Demographic 
and Health Survey (DHS) data for 44 developing countries. The major finding of the paper is 
that girls are at a great educational disadvantage in particular regions such as South Asia and 
North, Western, and Central Africa. There are two other new ﬁndings. First, while gender gaps 
are large in a subset of countries, wealth gaps are large in almost all of the countries studied and 
typically larger than corresponding gender gaps. Second, and of special concern is in particular 
countries where a large number of female disadvantage from enrollment; wealth interacts with 
gender to exacerbate the gap in educational outcomes. This paper thus identified the causes of 
disparities in education in 44 developing countries. No doubt the measure of disparity used by 
this paper is one of the legitimate measures; it cannot be used for the calculation of within group 
disparity. Actually, this measure requires some reference group for comparison. 
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Masakazu (2009) estimated inequality in education in Japan by using Gini coefficient, 
and considered factors that cause changes in the distribution of education as this orientation 
toward advanced education progresses. This study was fundamentally focused on Japanese 
economy and may not imply specific picture of LMI countries. 
All of those measures cannot reflect the socioeconomic dimension on inequalities in 
health. However, the education concentration index meets the minimal requirements of an 
inequality measure in the sense that it reflects the socioeconomic dimension to inequalities in 
education. Actually, it reflects the experiences of the entire population (rather than just, say, 
social classes I and III); and it is sensitive to changes in the distribution of the population across 
socioeconomic groups (Adam Wagstaff et al 1991). Further, to illustrate the importance of 
having a reliable measure of inequality in comparative studies of inequalities in education, ECI 
gives more reliable measure of inequality than that provided by education Gini and other 
measures discuss in previous paragraphs.  None of the previous studies check whether the 
principle of equal schooling for equal need (ESEN) was fulfilled in the respective countries of 
their study.  
Unlike other studies reviewed in previous paragraphs, my study calculates the income-
related inequality in education (IRIE) and compares whether the principle of equal schooling for 
equal need (ESEN) is fulfilled in LMI countries represented by Albania, Nepal, Tajikistan and 
Tanzania. Inequality in education is calculated by using an education concentration index, and an 
HI index is used to test whether the principle of ESEN is fulfilled in the countries under study. In 
addition, my study identifies the causes of educational inequality in those countries and 
decomposes the total inequalities among the determinants of education (years of schooling). 
Finally, it answers the question: could LMI countries reduce IRIE sustainably?  But my research 
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does not attempt to find a causal relationship between inequality in education and growth even 
though they could be jointly determined and mutually underpinned. 
3.3 Inequality in Income  
This section summarizes some of the pertinent literature associated with calculation and 
interpretation of income inequality. Literature associated with the decomposition of income 
inequality is also reviewed. Different from the existing practice on decomposition of income 
Gini, my research uses the linear decomposition technique proposed by Wagstaff et al (2003) for 
the decomposition of income Gini among the determinants of income.  
 Simon Kuznets (1955) answers the following two questions: (a) does inequality in the 
distribution of income increase or decrease in the course of a country's economic growth? and (b) 
what factors determine the secular level and trends of income inequalities? Inequality in income 
distribution decreases with increase in economic growth in developed countries. That means the 
per capita income of the lower income quintile increases faster than that of upper income 
quintile, whereas inequality in income distribution is higher and per capita GDP growth is lower 
in developing countries. The factors responsible for high inequality are technological changes, 
concentration of savings and property, and the rate of industrialization and urbanization. 
Robert J. Barro (1999) argued that inequality retards growth in poor countries but 
encourages growth in industrial or developed countries. Growth tends to fall with greater 
inequality when per capita GDP is below around $2000 (1985 U.S. dollars) and to rise with 
inequality when per capita GDP is above $2000. 
Nancy Birdsall (2005) argued that in developing countries inequality is usually 
economically destructive. It interacts with underdeveloped markets and ineffective government 
programs to slow growth which in turn slows the progress of reducing poverty. 
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In that sense, the reduction of inequality in income in poor countries is urgent for the 
alleviation of poverty and achievement of higher economic growth. My research thus calculates 
and interprets the existing inequality in income for Albania, Nepal, Tajikistan and Tanzania. It 
will also identify the sustainable policies that could reduce inequality in income. 
 Bourguignon, F. (1979) decomposes the inequality in income by population subgroup. He 
defines the decomposable inequality measure as a measure that the total inequality of a 
population can be broken down into a weighted average of the inequality existing within 
subgroups of the population and the inequality existing between them. Thus, decomposable 
measures differ only by the weights given to the inequality within the subgroups of the 
population. 
 Shorrocks, A. F. (1982) proposed the inequality decomposition by factor components. In 
this paper, he disaggregates the income of individuals or households into different factor 
components, such as earnings, investment income, and transfer payments. This paper proposed 
the method to assess the contributions of these sources to total income inequality.  
 Basically, those conventional decomposition measures proposed by Bourguignon, F. 
(1979) and Shorrocks (1982) provide only limited information on the determinants of income 
inequality. 
During the early 1970s, Blinder and Oaxaca (1973) proposed the regression-based 
decomposition method. However, this method did not achieve sufficient attention until the early 
1990s. Later, Juhn et al (1993) calculates and decomposes the inequality in male wage earnings 
in the US between 1963 and 1989 using the technique proposed by Blinder-Oaxaca (B-O) 
method. In this paper, they decompose the inequality in wage into the determinants of wage. As 
per this paper, much of the increase in wage inequality for males over the period of study was 
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due to increased returns to the components of skill other than years of schooling and years of 
labor market experience. Further, Bourguignon et al (2001) extend the application of the B-O 
method for the decomposition of inequality in income among its determinants.  
Guanghua Wan and Zhangyue Zhou (2005) studied income inequality in rural China: 
regression-based decomposition using household data. This paper uses household-level data and 
attempts to apply the regression-based decomposition framework to the study of inequality 
accounting in rural China. They find that capital input is the most significant determinant of 
income inequality in China. Further, farming structure is more important than labor and other 
inputs in contributing to income inequality across households. Geography has been the dominant 
factor but is becoming less important in recent years for explaining total inequality.  
My research, however, calculates the income inequality using an income Gini. Then, it 
decomposes the income inequality into the covariates of the income equation using the total 
differential decomposition method proposed by Wagstaff, et al (2003). Thus, I decomposed the 
inequality of income into its determinants. The determinants of income are broadly classified 
into socio-economic, geographic and demographic factors. Finally, my work proposes the 
mechanism to measure the effect of policy change on inequality in income and recommends 
some sustainable policies to minimize that inequality in those countries. 
3.4 Inequality and Growth 
Because of the innovation of wide spread technology and its application in agriculture, 
industry and service sectors, economic activities and economic growth are widely knowledge-
based. The latter is mainly determined by the general health status and the inequality in health 
and average years of schooling and inequalities in educational opportunities among the 
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population. Thus, inequality in health and education are the major impediments of equitable 
distribution of income and economic growth.  
Endeavors to identify the determinants of economic growth have been made from the 
early 1990s. Many variables have been tested, but only a few have been identified as being 
statistically significant to explain economic growth. Human capital is now almost unanimously 
accepted as being an indispensible factor to determine economic growth. Further, sustained and 
continuous growth depends on the levels of human capital whose stock increases as a result of 
better education, better health, and new opportunities for learning and training facilities.  
From the early 1990s, the role of human capital was mainly linked to education and then 
to health and nutrition. Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992) raise the importance of considering 
health and nutrition in a broad analysis of human capital and then to economic growth. Fogel 
(1994), Barro (1996), and Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004) examines the relationship between 
economic growth and population health. All of this literature raises the issues and importance of 
population health on economic growth. As the disparity in population health reduces the process 
of human capital formation and as human capital is one of the indispensible factors for sustained 
and continuous growth, disparity in population health reduces the rate of economic growth. 
The relationship between  the  distribution  of years of schooling in a population  and  the  
distribution  of  income  has  long been a fundamental issue in the literature of income inequality 
(Lam and Levison, 1992). A number of authors such as Chiswick (1971), Knight and Sabot 
(1987) and Marin and Pachoropoulos (1976) have focused their research on developing countries 
on the issues of how increase in the level of schooling over time affects earning inequality. Their 
studies have pointed out that the effect of educational expansion on earning inequality is difficult 
to predict a priori.  
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Even though there are conflicting results for developing countries, there should be some 
causal relationship among economic growth, income redistribution, and years of schooling or 
education level of the general population. Theoretically, an average increase in educational 
attainment results in a relative increase in the supply of skilled workforce, which in turn 
enhances average labor productivity and increases the rate of economic growth (Barro, 1991; 
Barro and Lee, 1993, 1997; Barro and Sala- i -Martin, 1995; Aghion and Howitt, 1998). If 
educational inequality is higher in a society, the resulting higher levels of output tend to 
represent a higher inequality in the redistribution of incomes, and therefore induce more poverty 
(Glomm and Ravikumar, 1992; Benabou, 1996a; Thomas, Wang and Fan, 2001; Lopez, Thomas 
and Wang, 2002). Thus, equitable distribution of education could be imperative for poverty-
reducing growth strategy. It is interesting to see the relationship among inequalities in education 
and income, and economic growth with this conflicting finding.  
In addition, education is important from various standpoints. It is the key for the 
establishment of a democratized, responsible, decentralized and civilized society. Education is 
imperative to improve general health conditions and to reduce the social, cultural and ethnic 
disparities in the society. The positive externalities thus created through education provision 
further enhance the processes of economic growth and development. Likewise, income and 
population health are very important factors to have better education, and better education and 
better health are indispensible factors for sustained growth. My research thus studied the 
relationship among the inequality of income, education and health and concludes that the 
integrated approach of development sustainably reduces inequality in income, education and 
health. A sustainable reduction of inequality in those factors in LMI countries should enhance 
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the human capital that ultimately promotes the economic growth and helps to establish the 
egalitarian-based society in LMI countries. 
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Chapter 4 
 Data and Methods 
Chapter 3 fundamentally focused on the review of literature that is associated with this 
research. Chapter 4, however, concentrates on the data and method used for this research. 
Section 4.1 of this chapter briefly discusses the sources and nature of data used for this research. 
Likewise, section 4.2 discusses the detail of the methodology used for the current research. The 
generalized version of the methodology proposed in this chapter is applied for the specific 
research of inequality in health care utilization, education and income in Chapters 5 and 6, 
respectively. 
4.1 Sources of Data 
This study is primarily based on the household survey data collected by the statistical 
office of the respective governments of Albania, Nepal, Tajikistan and Tanzania. These data 
were collected under the guidelines of Living Standards Measurement Study (LSMS) project of 
the World Bank. The LSMS was established by the Development Economics Research Group 
(DECRG) to explore ways of improving the type and quality of household data collected by 
statistical offices in developing countries. Table 5 describes the survey of the four non-
institutional populations on which the current set of analysis is based. The methodologies of the 
survey are comparable because all four surveys were carried out according to the LSMS 
guideline. To ensure the representativeness of all types of households in the survey, stratified 
sampling designs were employed with appropriate application of sampling weights. 
LSMS surveys collect data on many dimensions of household well-being, including 
consumption, income, savings, employment, health, education, fertility, nutrition, housing and 
migration. From this wide range of common comparable variables, I selected income to measure 
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the socioeconomic status of representative households and for ranking purpose. Other variables 
used in the study are health indicators variables such as number and probability of doctor visits; 
self-access health measure (measured in a 5-point scale); demographic variables such as age and 
sex; socio-economic variables such as education, land-holding and poverty; and geographic 
location. Data for leading health indicator variables such as health sector expenditure as a 
percentage of GDP, public and private share of health sector expenditure, and other variables that 
are presented in Tables 1 to 4 above, are downloaded from the websites of Kaiser Family 
Foundation and the World Bank. 
Table 5: Description of Surveys 
Territory Year Survey 
Survey 
Institution 
National 
Coverage 
Survey 
Design 
Sampling 
Unit 
Household 
Size 
Recall 
Period 
Albania 2005 
Albania 
Living 
Standard 
Measurement 
Survey 
Institute of 
Statistics 
Nationally 
Representative 
Stratified 
two stage 
cluster 
sampling 
Household 3,638 
4 
Weeks 
Nepal 2004 
Nepal Living 
Standard 
Survey 
Central 
Bureau of 
Statistics 
Nationally 
Representative 
Two stage 
stratified 
Household 3,912 1 Year 
Tajikistan 2007 
Tajikistan  
Living 
Standards 
Measurement 
Survey 
State 
Statistical 
Agency 
Nationally 
Representative 
Stratified 
random 
probability 
sampling 
Household 4,860 
4 
Weeks 
Tanzania-
Kagera 
2004 
Kagera 
Health and 
Development 
Survey 2004 
Economic 
Development 
Initiatives 
Kagera Area 
Representative 
Two stage 
stratified 
random 
sampling 
Household 900 
4 
Weeks 
 
4.2 Method 
This section first explains how demand function can be derived using the static utility 
maximization framework. This generalized version of the derivation of demand curve using the 
static utility maximization framework is available elsewhere. The framework developed in this 
generalized version is used to derive the specific demand curves in health care utilization and 
education later in Chapters 5 and 6, respectively. 
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Estimation of the Demand Function: Demand for any goods and services can be derived 
in a static one-period utility maximization framework. Let us suppose that an individual 
consumes only two goods X and Y. The consumer then derived his/her utility from consuming 
units of some composite goods (X) and units of some services such as health care or education 
(Y) that flow from his/her initial stock of human capital (h0). Then the total utility function for 
this individual is:  
( , , )U U X Y E            (1) 
where E represents the exogenous tests and preferences of the individual. 
Utility is assumed to increase at a decreasing rate with respect to X and Y.  
The consumer’s optimization problem is then: 
1 2
1 2
( , , ) 1 2 0 1 2 1 2
1 2
Maximize [ , ( , , , , , , , ), ]
Subject to 
C y y
x y y
U U X Y y y h T s s d d E
M P X P y P y

  
     (2) 
where Y = Y (y1, y2, h0, T, s1, s2,…  …, d1, d2,… …,t) is the production function for services; y1 
and y2 are  the inputs of production other than the consumer’s initial endowment of human 
capital (h0), current state of production technology (T) and other socio-economic (s1, s2,….,sn), 
demographic and geographic (d1, d2,……,dn) characteristics and time cost (t) to achieve the 
service Y. Further, I assume that Y is concave with respect to both y1 and y2.  
The solution of this problem gives the typical demand function for an individual 
consumer. The demand function can be written as: 
1 2
1 1 0 1 2 1 2, , , , , , , ,... ...,s , , ,... ...,d ,
y y
n n
x x x
P P Y
y y E h T s s d d t
P P P
 
  
 
   (3) 
For the given price of composite commodity Px, demand for y1 is determined by the out-
of-pocket price for y1, relative out-of-pocket prices for y2, consumer’s net income, and other 
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factors listed in the equation (3) above. That is: 
1 1 1 2 0 1 2 1 2( , , , , , , , ,... ...,s , , ,... ...,d , )y y n ny y P P Y E h T s s d d t     (4) 
Assuming a linear relationship between the dependent and independent variables, the 
service (y1) used is computed from a regression of all individuals in the sample, explaining y1 
with a set of explanatory variables. So, I run the following linear regression to estimate the 
service (y1) used by individual i.  
1 0
1
 
m
i j ji i
j
y x  

           (5) 
where yi denotes the dependent variable (service y1 used by individual (i), xji is a set of 
explanatory variables of individual i listed in equation (4) above and i  is an error term. Then 
equation (5) is estimated using appropriate regression techniques. The estimated coefficients   
are used for the decomposition of concentration index among the determinants of y1 and for the 
calculation of the effect of policy change on disparity in y1.  
Calculation of Income Related Inequality: To measure the income-related inequality in 
the utilization of service (y1). I use a concentration index (CI) proposed by Wagstaff, et al. 
(1991). CI lies in the range of (-1, 1), with a positive (negative) sign indicating pro-rich (pro-
poor) inequality. However, testing for differences between concentration indices requires 
confidence intervals. Thus, robust estimates for CI and its standard error are obtained by running 
the following convenient (weighted least squares) regression of (transformed) yi 
on relative rank 
(Kakwani et al, 1997): 
iii
R
Ry ,111
22




                                                                                           
(6) 
where  mean of yi series as defined in equation (5) above, iR Rank of 
thi  individual on the 
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basis of his or her household income after they are arranged in non-descending order. To 
calculate rank, I use the following formula:    
1
1 2
11 i
j iji
ww
n
R . Similarly, 
2
R  is the 
variance of Ri, and 1

  is equal to CI . The estimated standard error of 1

  provides the estimated 
standard error of CI .  
Hypothesis 1:  The following hypothesis is tested. 
Null Hypothesis 0:)( 10 H . 
If the null hypothesis is rejected at 5% significance level, then we can argue that there is 
inequality in the utilization of service (y1).  
Following Wagstaff et al (2003), I use the following formula for the decomposition of 
income-related inequality in the utilization of service (y1).  
1
m
j j
j
GC
CI CI 

            (7) 
where CIj is the concentration index of respective variables as defined in the equation (6) above, 
and ηj is the estimated partial demand elasticity of the corresponding variables and j


j
j
x
. 
Further, GC  is the generalized concentration index which measures the inequality in error term 
(Shorrocks, 1983). That means inequality in the utilization of service (y1) is the weighted sum of 
the disparities of the determinants of demand equation defined in equation (5) above with 
weights equal to corresponding partial demand elasticity. 
Controlling for the need, whether the distribution of the facility of service y1 is equal to 
all, is then measured by the horizontal inequity (HI) index proposed by Wagstaff and van 
Doorslaer (2000), which is given in equation (8) below. Its value lies between (-2, 2), with a 
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positive (negative) sign indicating pro-rich (pro-poor) inequity. A zero HI for a country 
represents the principle of ETEN is fulfilled for that country. 



k
j
jjCICIHI
1
                     (8) 
where the second term in equation (8) is the weighted sum of the disparities due to need factors. 
Measurement of the Policy Effect: To measure the effect of change in (increasing or 
decreasing as per requirement) average xj on income related inequality of y1, I use the following 
comparative statistic derivatives. Partially differentiating equation (8) with respect to average xj 
we get: 
 1  2  3
j
j j j j j
Term Term Term
dCIdCI CI dCI d dCI
dx x d dx dCI dx


    
    
        
     
          
                 (9) 
Term 3 in equation (9) equals zero because a proportionate increase in xj does not change 
the inequality in xj. Solving term 1 and 2 of equation (9) gives the following result.  
( )
 .
j
j
j j
dCI
CI CI
d x x


                      (10)  
where j  = coefficient of xj, jx  = mean of variable xj,   = mean of dependent variable y1 in 
equation (5) above, jCI  = inequality of xj and CI  = inequality in utilization of service y1.  Then, 
equation (10) is reduced to:  
 
j
j
j j
CI CIdCI
e
d x x
 
  
  
                      (11)  
where je  is the elasticity of demand for the utilization of service y1. A detailed solution of  
equation (9) to get equations (10) and (11) is given in appendix 1. 
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Hypothesis 2: Whether the increase in mean 
jx  significantly increases or decreases the 
inequality in the utilization of service 1y is tested by using following hypothesis.  
Null Hypothesis ( 0H ): Right hand side term of equation (11) = 0. 
If the null hypothesis is rejected at the 5% significance level, then we can argue that the 
average change in xj can significantly change income related inequality in the utilization of 
service y1. To test this hypothesis, the bootstrapping technique proposed by Efron (1997) and 
Mills and Zandvakili (1997) is used. 
The increase in mean xj has two effects (Wagestaff, et al. 2003):  
The Direct Effect:  through elasticity, mean of xj and jCI .  
Let 0jx  . Increase in average xj further increases inequality in the utilization of service 
y1 if 0je  and decreases inequality if 0je . The sign of je  depends on the sign of estimated 
j  in equation (5). The direct effect also appears through )( CICI j  . If (CIj – CI) < 0, an 
increase in xj directly reduces inequality in the utilization of service y1 by an individual. 
However, if (CIj – CI) > 0, an increase in xj cannot reduce inequality in the utilization of service 
y1 by an individual. That leads to the following two propositions. 
Proposition 1: Increase in average xj does not always decrease income-related inequality 
in the utilization of service y1 even though it increases the amount of y1 utilization.  
Proof: Suppose 0j  in equation (5). Then, increase in average xj increases the amount 
of the utilization of service y1. In this case, 0je .Let  0jx  .  So, whether the increase in 
average xj decreases income-related inequality, the utilization of service y1 is based on whether
0)( CICI j . As jCI  is income-related inequality in xj, it may be positive or negative. 
Positive/negative jCI  represents the pro-rich/pro-poor income-related inequality in xj.  When 
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0jCI  and CI < 0, then   0jCI CI  . Then, an equi-proportionate increase in xj holding jCI  
constant increases CI  towards pro-poor such that 0)( CICI j  and is larger than its previous 
value.   In this case, an increase in average xj instead of reducing income-related inequality in the 
utilization of service y1, increases it. 
When 0jCI  and CI > 0 such that 0)( CICI j , then equi-proportionate increase in 
the average xj holding jCI  constant increases income-related inequality in the utilization of 
services y1 towards pro-rich. In this situation, increase in average xj cannot reduce income related 
inequality in the utilization of services y1 until 0)( CICI j . Similarly, we can analyze the case 
of CIj < 0 and 0CI  and 0jCI  and . 
2.  The Indirect Effect: Through concentration indices via average level of utilization of 
service y1.  A rise in average xj increases average level of utilization of service y1 if 0j and 
decreases if 0j . If 0j , an increase in mean xj increases CI  towards pro-rich and if 
0j ,
 
an increase in mean xj decreases CI towards pro-poor. This effect is indirect.  
3.  Total Effect:  The total effect of increase in mean xj is thus the sum of direct and 
indirect effects. Hence, the net effect of the rise in average level of xj on income-related 
inequality in the utilization of service
 
y1 depends upon whether the xj is more unequally 
distributed than the utilization of service y1, (i.e., whether )( CICI j   is positive or negative). 
Thus, an increase in average xj can reduce inequality in the utilization of service y1 if and only if 
that could reduce inequality in xj. 
Proposition 2: An integrated approach of development is always stronger than the 
sectoral development policy for the reduction of income-related inequality in the utilization of 
service y1 if increase in average xj reduces inequalities in xj.  
0CI
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Proof: By assumption, )( CICI j   decreases when xj increases. So, integrated efforts of 
increasing average xj are always stronger than the sectoral policy effect because the absolute 
value of  
1
m
ji
CI CI

 is always greater than the absolute value of )( CICI j  .  Even if some 
of these terms are increasing and the others are decreasing, then an integrated effect helps to 
minimize the total effect if the total effect is increasing and maximize the total effect if it is 
decreasing. Hope (1982) also discuss the idea of integrated approach of development. 
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Chapter 5 
Inequality in Health Care Utilization 
This chapter fundamentally concentrates on the measurement and interpretation of 
inequality in health care utilization in LMI countries represented by Albania, Nepal, Tajikistan 
and Tanzania. Based on the generalized version of the methodology developed in Chapter 4, 
specific methodology used for the calculation of IRIHCU is discussed in detail in section 5.3 of 
this chapter.  Based on this methodology, this chapter calculates the income-related inequality in 
health care utilization and inequity in health care delivery. Finally, it decomposes the inequality 
among the determinants of health care demand function and proposes a measure to estimate the 
effect of policy change on disparity in health care utilization. This measure is simply defined as 
the policy effect of disparity in health care utilization. 
5.1 Data  
As explained in section 4.1 of Chapter 4, this study is primarily based on household 
survey data collected by the statistical office of the respective governments of Albania, Nepal, 
Tajikistan and Tanzania. However, descriptive statistics of all the variables used for the study of 
inequality in health care utilization is presented in Table 6.  
As a proxy for health care demand, my study uses the probability and total number of 
physician service use by ill health patients in a given recall period in all countries under study. 
First is the answer to the question: Did you visit the doctor in the recall period? The second is the 
answer of the question: How many times did you visit the doctor in the recall period? The 
probability of physician service used by ill health patients is a binary variable. It takes the value 
0 for no doctor visits or 1 otherwise.  
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However, the total number of doctor visits is the number of times an ill-health patient 
visited the doctor in a given recall period. It is a discrete variable that can take any non-negative 
values. The study is conducted for chronic ill and general ill health patients. To reduce the degree 
of heterogeneity, some of the variables such as: distance to doctor’s service and length of illness 
are transferred from continuous to the categorical variables. Another goal of these 
transformations is to normalize the variables and reduce the degree of heterogeneity.  
5.2 Method 
Estimation of the Health Care Demand Function: Demand for health care can be 
derived in a static one-period utility maximization framework. This derivation is based upon the 
general framework developed for one-period utility maximization in Chapter 4. This simple 
utility maximization framework is complicated by the fact that a fraction of individuals in a 
given time period is either infected with chronic disease, such as diabetes and cancer, or suffers 
from general illness such as typhoid, cholera and fractures. Thus, all individuals perceive their 
health state in terms of being disease-free, or as having either chronic illness or general illness, in 
a particular time  The individual consumer then derived his/her utility from consuming units of 
some composite goods ( )C and units of health care services ( )H that flow from their initial stock 
of health capital 0( )h . Mathematically, utility is: 
( , , )U U C H E                      (12) 
where E  represents the exogenous testes and preferences of individual    
Utility is assumed to increase at a decreasing rate with respect to C and H  Further 
assume that health care service can be produced with varying combinations of prescription drugs 
( )Q  and medical services ( )M , such as office visits, inpatient days or a number of outpatient 
visits conditioned on the representative consumer’s initial endowment of health capital 0( )h , 
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current state of medical technology ( )T , distance to health care facility ( )D , education of the 
individual ( )e , individual’s age ( )a , sex of the individual ( )s , depth of poverty index ( )vp  and 
time cost of treatment ( )t . For each of the expositions, I ignore a set of other health care “goods” 
and “bads” such as exercise, diet, alcohol and tobacco use. Thus, the production function for 
units of health services can be written as: 
0( , , , , , , , , , )vH H Q M h T D e a s p t                   (13) 
where H is assumed to be concave with respect to both Q and M . 
Assume that the consumer’s income net of taxes and insurance premium ( )y  is fully 
utilized to purchase the composite goods ( )C , and the two inputs ( )Q  and ( )M to produce health 
services. Thus, individual consumer income is: 
c q my PC P Q P M                        (14) 
where 
qP  is the out-of-pocket price for drugs, mP  is the out-of-pocket price for medical services, 
and cP  is the price for composite goods.  
Then, the individual consumer optimization problem is to maximize utility: 
0[ , ( , , , , , , , , , ), ]vU U C H Q M h T D e a s p t Ex  subject to c q my PC P Q P M   . 
Solving this utility maximization problem yields the representative consumer demand 
function for prescription drugs ( )Q and medical services ( )M as a function of the relative out-of-
pocket drug price, relative out-of-pocket price of medical services, and his/her real net income, 
and other determinants in the model such as initial endowment of health capital 0( )h , current 
state of medical technology ( )T , distance to health care facility ( )D , education of the individual 
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( )e , individual’s age ( )a , sex of the individual ( )s and time cost of treatment ( )t . The typical 
demand function for medical care use is thus: 
0, , , , , , , , , ,
q m
c c c
P P y
M M E h T D e a s t
P P P
 
  
 
                                    (15) 
For the given price of composite commodity cP , demand for medical services is 
determined by the out-of-pocket price of medical services, out-of-pocket drug price, his/her net 
income, and other factors listed in the equation (15) above. That is, 
0( , , , , , , , , , , , )q m vM M P P y Ex h T D E a s p t                   (16) 
Assuming a linear relationship between the dependent and independent variables, the 
physician service use is computed from a regression of all individuals in the sample, explaining 
number and probability of physician visits with a set of explanatory variables. So, under the 
assumptions of ordinary least squares (OLS)
1
, I run the following linear regression to estimate 
physician service use by individual i . 
0 1 2
3 1
ln
j n
i i i k ki p pi i
k p j
M y e x z     
  
                       (17) 
where iM  denotes the dependent variable (probability and number of physician service use by 
individual i  in a given recall period),  ln iy is the (logarithm of) the household income of 
individual i , ie  is the education measured in terms of years of schooling of individual i , kx is a 
set of k need indicator variables such as age, sex, health status measured in terms of self access 
health; pz  is p set of non-need-related variables such as distance to health care facility, depth of 
                                                 
1
 Non linear models such as ordered probit for total number of physician service utilization and binery probit for 
probability of physician service utilization models are also tested. Outcomes of those models are not superior over 
the OLS model. Thus, I decided to use OLS for further analysis. 
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poverty of thi households, time cost of treatment of individual i , and i  is an error term. 
 Measurement and Decomposition of Inequality: Income-related inequality in physician 
service utilization (IRIPSU) is calculated for the chronic ill health and general ill health patient 
and for the probability of physician service utilization model and total number of physician 
service utilization model.  
To measure the IRIPSU, I use concentration index ( )CI proposed by Wagstaff et al 
(1991). CI  lies in the range of (-1, 1), with a positive (negative) sign indicating pro-rich (pro-
poor) inequality. However, testing for differences between concentration indices requires 
confidence intervals. Thus, robust estimates for CI and its standard error are obtained by running 
the weighted least squares regression of (transformed) iM on relative rank proposed by Kakwani 
(1997). The coefficient of relative rank 1( ) in the weighted regression equation measures CI .   
Hypothesis 1: In all cases, the following hypothesis is tested.   
Null Hypothesis 0:)( 10 H . 
If the null hypothesis is rejected at 5 percent significant level, then we can argue that 
there is inequality in health care utilization.  
Following Wagstaff et al (2003), this paper uses the following equation for the 
decomposition of IRIPSU.  
3 1
j n
y y e e k k p p
k p j
GC
CI CI CI CI CI    
  
                     (18) 
where   is the mean of health care (physician service) use and ( )iM , yCI , eCI , kCI  and pCI  
are the concentration indices of respective variables as defined in equation (17) above, and y , 
e , k  and p  are the estimated partial demand elasticities of the corresponding variables and  
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y 1
lnY


, 
2e
E
 

 , where Y is the mean of income ( )iy  series, and E  is the mean of 
education ( )ie  series, etc. GC  is the generalized concentration index which measures the 
inequality in error term.  
Inequity in physician service delivery is then calculated by the horizontal inequity ( )HI
index proposed by Wagstaff and van Doorslaer (2000). Its value lies between (-2; 2), with a 
positive (negative) sign indicating pro-rich (pro-poor) inequity. A zero HI for a country 
represents that the principle of equal treatment for equal need is fulfilled for that country. 
Measurement of the Policy Effect: The measure I propose in the following section 
explains the mechanism to quantify the policy effect on disparity in health care utilization. Here, 
the same measure is used to quantify the effect of increase in average income and education on 
reduction of IRIPSU. To my knowledge, this has not been done before. 
To measure the effect of increasing average income and education on income-related 
inequality, I use the following comparative statistic derivatives. Partially differentiating equation 
(20) with respect to average income, we get:  
 1  2  3
ln ln ln
ln ln ln
y
y
Term Term Term
dCIdCI CI d Y dCI d d Y dCI d Y
dY Y dY d d Y dY dCI d Y dY


   
   
                    
            (19) 
Term 3 in equation (19) equals zero because a proportionate increase in income does not 
change inequality in income, as measured in relative terms. Solving term 1 and 2 of equation 
(19) gives the following result.  
1 ( )y
dCI
CI CI
dY Y


  
                  
(20)  
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where 1  = coefficient of income in equation (17) above, yCI  = inequality in income (i.e., Gini 
Index) and CI  = inequality in physician service utilization. Equation (20) is then reduced to:   
y
y
CI CIdCI
dY Y

 
  
 
                   (21)  
Here, 
y  is the income elasticity of demand for physician service utilization. A detailed 
solution of equation (19) to get equations (20) and (21) is given in Appendix 2. Here, the right 
hand side of equation (21) is defined as the policy effect of disparity in health care utilization 
with respect to income because a policy of increasing average income changes IRIPSU by this 
process or mechanism. 
Similarly, partially differentiating equation (18) with respect to average education ( )E , 
we get: 
e
e
CI CIdCI
dE E

 
  
 
                   (22)  
where e  is the education elasticity of demand for physician service utilization and eCI  is 
education concentration index.  
Equations (21) and (22) establish a good mechanism and give us meaningful policy 
implication for the reduction of inequality in physician service utilization for the countries under 
study.  
Hypothesis 2: Whether the increase in mean income/education significantly 
increases/decreases the inequality in physician’s service utilization is tested by using the 
following hypothesis.  
Null Hypothesis ( 0H ): Right hand side term of equation (21) / (22) = 0. 
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If the null hypothesis is rejected at 5 percent significance level, then we can argue that the 
average increase in income/education can significantly reduce or increase IRIPSU. To test this 
hypothesis, the bootstrapping method proposed by Efron, (1997) and Mills and Zandvakili, 
(1997) is used. 
The increase in mean income has two effects:  
The direct effect:  Through income elasticity, mean income and yCI . As 0Y , an 
increase in average income further increases inequality in physician service utilization if 0y   
and decrease inequality if 0y  . The sign of y  depends on the sign of the estimated 
coefficient of income 1( )  in equation (17). The direct effect also appears through )( CICI y  . If 
( )yCI CI  < 0; an increase in income directly reduces inequality in physician service utilization 
by ill health patients. However, if ( )yCI CI > 0, increase in average income cannot reduce 
income-related inequality in health care utilization. Similar analysis of increasing average 
education leads to the following proposition. 
Proposition 1: An increase in average income/education may not decrease income-
related inequality in health care utilization even though it increases the amount of health care 
utilization.  
Proof: Suppose 1 0   in equation (17). Then, increase in average income increases the 
amount of health care utilization. In this case, 0y  . 0Y  , (i.e., the average income of an 
individual is also positive). So, whether the increase in average income decreases income related 
inequality in health care utilization depends on whether ( ) 0yCI CI  . However, the income 
Gini is always non-negative, (i.e., CIy ≥ 0).  
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If 0CI , then ( ) 0yCI CI  . In this case, an equi-proportionate increase in income 
holding 
yCI  constant, increases CI  because the existing inequality in income further increases 
inequality in physician service utilization to the pro-poor or disadvantaged. Similarly, assume
0CI  such that ( ) 0yCI CI  . Then, an equi-proportionate increase in income holding yCI  
constant increases CI  because the existing inequality in income further increases inequality in 
physician service utilization to the pro-rich or well off. In both of these cases, increase in average 
income increases income-related inequality in health care utilization until that increase reduces 
.yCI  Similarly, we can explain the effect of increase in average education on IRIPSU. 
The indirect effect: Through concentration indices via average level of physician service 
utilization.  A rise in average income increases the average level of physician service utilization 
if 1 0  and decreases if 1 0  . If 1 0  , an increase in mean income increases CI  towards pro-
rich and if 1 0  ,
 
it decreases CI towards pro-poor. This effect is indirect.  
Total effect:  The total effect of increase in mean income/education is thus the sum of 
direct and indirect effect. Hence, the net effect of the rise in average level of income/education 
on income related inequality in physician service utilization depends on whether the 
income/education is more or less unequally distributed than physician service utilization, (i.e., 
whether ( )kCI CI  is positive or negative). Further, if increase in average income and education 
respectively reduces the inequalities in those variables, that could reduce 
yCI CI  term in 
equation (21) and eCI CI  term in equation (22) and hence the inequality in physician service 
utilization.  Thus, increase in average income and education can reduce inequality in health care 
utilization sustainably if and only if that could reduce inequality in income and education, 
respectively.  
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Proposition 2: An integrated approach of development is always stronger than the 
sectoral development policy for the reduction of IRIPSU if an increase in average income and 
education reduces inequalities in income and education.  
Proof: By assumption, when the average income and education increases, ( )yCI CI  and
)( CICI e   decreases. So, integrated efforts of increasing average income and education are 
always stronger than the sectoral policy effect because the absolute value of ( )yCI CI  + 
)( CICI e  is always greater than the absolute value of either ( )yCI CI  or )( CICI e  . Even if 
any one of these two is increasing and the other is decreasing, then an integrated effect helps to 
minimize the total effect if the total effect is increasing and to maximize the total effect if it is 
decreasing.  
5.3 Results  
 Inequality and Inequity in Physician Service Utilization: The concentration indices 
calculated for patients with chronic illness and general illness in Albania, Nepal, Tajikistan, and 
Tanzania are reported in Table 7. These are calculated for the probability of physician service 
utilization and total number of physician service utilization. All of the concentration indices in 
the probability of use model are statistically significant at better than 1 percent for both cases 
(chronic and general illness) except for Tajikistan and Tanzania. Thus, the null hypothesis is 
rejected for Nepal and Albania. However, for the total number of physician service visits, the 
calculated concentration indices are statistically significant at better than 1 percent for Albania 
and Nepal in both cases (chronic and general illness) but insignificant for Tajikistan and 
Tanzania. Therefore, the null for Tajikistan and Tanzania cannot be rejected.  
Although the CI numbers show substantial disparity across nations, the country from sub-
Saharan Africa (Tanzania) displays more even distribution of physician service than the others—  
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Table 7: Income Related Inequality and Inequity 
Countries 
Model I: Probability of Physician Service Utilization 
Chronic Illness 
Prob. CI 
95% Confidence 
Interval 
HI
+
 
95% Confidence 
Interval 
Albania 0.596 -0.021* -0.022 to -0.021 -0.012* -0.013 to -0.012 
Nepal 0.792 0.049* 0.048 to 0.050 0.053* 0.052 to 0.053 
Tajikistan 0.916 0.011* 0.010 to 0.011 0.009* 0.009 to 0.009 
Tanzania 0.700 0.002 0.001 to 0.002 0.002* 0.001 to 0.002 
 General Illness 
Albania 0.491 -0.012 -0.013 to -0.011 0.016* 0.015 to 0.017 
Nepal 0.657 0.026* 0.025 to 0.026 0.029* 0.028 to 0.030 
Tajikistan 0.370 0.032 0.030 to 0.033 0.058* 0.056 to 0.059 
Tanzania 0.412 0.006 0.005 to 0.007 -0.001** -0.001 to 0.000 
Countries 
Model II: Total Number of Physician Service Utilization 
Chronic Illness 
TNo. CI 
95% Confidence 
Interval 
HI
+
 
95% Confidence 
Interval 
Albania 0.915 -0.045* -0.046 to -0.044 -0.016* -0.017 to -0.015 
Nepal 1.462 0.114* 0.113 to 0.115 0.132* 0.131 to 0.133 
Tajikistan 2.065 0.008 0.007 to 0.008 0.007* 0.006 to 0.008 
Tanzania 0.997 -0.003 -0.003 to -0.002 -0.004* -0.004 to -0.003 
 General Illness 
Albania 0.910 -0.057* -0.058 to -0.055 0.000 -0.002 to 0.002 
Nepal 0.953 0.095* 0.094 to 0.096 0.099* 0.098 to 0.100 
Tajikistan NA NA NA NA NA 
Tanzania NA NA NA NA NA 
Source:- Calculated by Author. 
Prob.: probability of use of all type of physician for the relevant recall period as per Table 2.1. 
TNo.: total number of physician visited per person per recall period as per Table 2.1. 
* Statistically significant (p < 0.01).        ** Statistically significant (p < 0.10). 
+ All HI indices, their 95% confidence interval, t-stats and p-values are calculated by using bootstrapping. 
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East Europe (Albania), Central Asia (Tajikistan) and South Asia (Nepal). The CIs of Tanzania 
range from 0.002 for chronic ill patients in probability of physician service use model to -0.003 
for the same patients in total number of physician use model are closer to zero. In contrast, the 
CIs for chronic ill patients in the probability of use model are 0.049 (pro-rich) in Nepal and         
-0.021 (pro-poor) in Albania. Tajikistan is an intermediate case with a CI of about 0.01. 
Similarly, we can compare the inequality in physician service utilization among Albania, Nepal, 
and Tajikistan in other models as well. 
For chronic ill patients in total number of the physician service utilization model, the 
value of CI is 0.114 in Nepal (Table 7).  This value is distinctly different and higher than the 
values of CIs in other cases of Nepal as well as the values of CIs in the three other countries of 
this study. This result though is not anomalous because specialist service in Nepal is 
concentrated in urban areas. Comparing this result with the result of the chronic ill patient in the 
probability of physician service utilization model, the chronic ill patient visits a physician for 
diagnoses and/or for prescription of medicine so that the value of CI in this model is less than 
that in total number of the physician service utilization model. However, the frequency of visit 
varied widely due to the inequitable distribution of specialist services in rural areas. Based on the 
results of CI for chronic ill patients in other countries, the specialist service is distributed more 
equitably than in Nepal (Table 7).  
After eliminating the influence of “need” factor from CI , we can arrive at horizontal 
inequity in physician service delivery (HI) which reflects the effects of income, education and 
other non-need-related factors stated in equation (17). All of the HI indices reported in Table 7 
are statistically significant at better than five percent significance level, indicating that there is 
patients in total number of the physician service utilization model in Albania. Following the 
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trend of CIs , a substantial variation in HI across countries is noted (Table 7). In the case of 
general ill patients, the positive HI indices imply pro-rich inequity in delivery of physician’s 
services in all countries except Tanzania in probability of the physician service utilization mode. 
However, the value of HI  index is almost zero in Tanzania and Albania compared with those of 
Nepal and Tajikistan. For chronically ill patients however, the HI  indices are almost zero for 
Tajikistan and Tanzania. That indicates the most equitable distribution of specialist services in 
those countries. However, a pro-poor inequity is noted in Albania and a pro-rich in Nepal.  
Decomposition Analysis: IRIPSU, as calculated in Table 7 for Albania, Nepal, Tajikistan 
and Tanzania, could be divided into different attributes, such as income, education, need-related-
factor, non-need-related-factor and a residual term as indicated by equation (17). The inequality 
in physician service utilization due to those attributes may be positive or negative. It is possible 
that these contributions could cancel each other out leaving the inequality in physician service 
utilization as constant. Thus, if physician services were utilized equally across income groups, 
the bar segments above and below the zero line in Figure 1 would be mutually offsetting. 
However, the need bar appears only in the case of perfect equity. If there are discrepancies 
between actual and need-expected distribution of use, other bars appear which indicate either the 
direct contribution of income and education or its effect through non-need-factors associated 
with physician service utilization.  
 The decomposition analysis confirms that the utilization of physician service in all of the 
countries under study is extensively affected by income rather than need factors. This is quite 
obvious because the share of out-of-pocket finance for health care utilization is very high in all 
of the countries under study.  After income, we can see the distinct role of non-need-related- 
factors such as education, geography, distance to the physician office and ethnicity. In both of  
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Figure 1a: Decomposition of Concentration Indices in Probability of Physician Service Use Model 
 
Figure 1b: Decomposition of Concentration Indices in Total Number of Physician Service Use Model
 
Alb.: Albania, Nep.: Nepal, Taj.: Tanzania and Tan.: Tanzania. 
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the cases presented in Figure 1a and 1b, the residual term is large for some countries such as 
Tanzania among chronic ill patients, attributable to the low explanatory power of the models. 
Policy Effect: The bootstrapping technique (with 1000 iterations) is used to calculate 
income and education effects, their 95 percent confidence interval, t-stat and their p-values. The 
calculated values of effects of average increase in income by $100.00 and education by 1 grade 
are reported in Table 8. In most of the cases, effects are statistically significant at better than 5 
percent significant level. However, for Tanzania the effect of education is statistically 
insignificant for chronic ill patient in total number of physician service use model and for general 
ill patient in probability of the physician service use model. Likewise, the education effect is 
statistically insignificant for general ill patients in Albania for probability of use model. Thus, the 
null hypothesis of zero impact is rejected in most of the cases, except some cases in Tanzania 
and Albania. That means the average increase in income/education can significantly reduce or 
increase the income-related inequality in physician service utilization. 
For total number of the physician service utilization model, among chronic ill patients, a 
$100 increase in mean income reduces IRIPSU in Nepal and Tanzania by 0.031 and 0.001 
respectively and increases inequality in Albania and Tajikistan by 0.025 and 0.014, respectively 
(Table 8). Similarly, an average increase in education (i.e., an average increase in years of 
schooling by 1 year), increases IRIPSU by 0.020, 0.009 and 0.001 in Albania, Nepal and 
Tajikistan, respectively, and decreases IRIPSU by 0.000 (insignificant) in Tanzania. We can 
make the similar interpretation for rest of the cases. Comparing these values with the 
corresponding values of concentration indices, impacts are scalable. This finding proves the 
statement of Proposition 1. However, if the redistribution of income and education respectively 
reduces inequality in income and education first, such a reduction in the covariate (income and 
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education)-specific inequality would in turn reduce inequality in physician service utilization 
through the mechanism proposed in equation (21) and (22). 
Table 8: Effect of Increase in Average Income and Education on Concentration Index  
Countries 
Income 
Effect 
95% Confidence Interval 
Education 
Effect 
95% Confidence Interval 
Model I: Probability of Physician Service Utilization Model 
     Chronic Illness 
     Albania 0.050* 0.05 to 0.05 0.011* 0.011 to  0.011 
     Nepal 0.002* 0.001 to 0.002 0.004* 0.004 to  0.004 
     Tajikistan 0.019* 0.019 to 0.019 0.001* 0.001 to 0.001 
     Tanzania 0.011* 0.011 to 0.011 -0.000* -0.000 to -0.000 
     
General Illness 
     Albania 0.026* 0.025 to 0.026 0.000 0.000 to 0.000 
     Nepal -0.004* -0.004 to -0.004 0.001* 0.001 to 0.001 
     Tajikistan 0.046* 0.046 to 0.046 -0.001* -0.001 to -0.001 
     Tanzania 0.014* 0.014 to 0.014 -0.000 -0.000 to -0.000 
     
Model II: Total Number of Physician Service Utilization Model 
     
Chronic Illness 
     Albania 0.025* 0.025 to 0.025 0.020* 0.019 to  0.020 
     Nepal -0.031* -0.031 to -0.031 0.009* 0.008 to 0.009 
     Tajikistan 0.014* 0.014 to 0.014 0.0004* 0.001 to 0.001 
     Tanzania -0.001* -0.001 to -0.001 -0.000 -0.000 to -0.000 
     
General Illness 
     Albania 0.012* 0.012 to 0.012 0.008* 0.008 to 0.008 
     Nepal -0.040* -0.040 to -0.040 0.002* 0.002 to 0.002 
     Tajikistan NA NA NA NA 
     Tanzania NA NA NA NA 
     
Source: - Calculated by Author.                                                                                                                  
* Statistically significant at (p < 0.01).        ** Statistically significant at (p < 0.10). 
Programs that enhance the efficiency of rural farmers and the productivity of urban poor 
will likely reduce inequality in physician service utilization by causing improvements in the 
income Gini. An improvement in income distribution improves the overall health situation in a 
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country (Subramanian and Kawachi, 2004). They have shown an inverse relationship between 
income inequality and population health. Further income is correlated positively with education 
and thus presumably alleviates disparity in education (Deaton, 2002). The income-specific 
inequality reduction could possibly be achieved by promoting the use of modern inputs, training 
rural farmers on scientific farming and by providing vocational training to both rural and urban 
poor. In the same way, some provision of micro credit could contribute to lowering income 
inequality (Kai and Hamori, 2009). The essence of this argument is that a reduction in outcome 
variable, inequality in physician service utilization, will necessitate a suitable redistribution of 
the contributing factors in health care demand function such that there is a reduction in inequality 
in those factors first (see equation (21) and (22)). 
5.4 Discussion  
My research proposes a clear mechanism to measure the effect of policy change on 
inequality called policy effect of inequality and examines how increased income and education 
reduce IRIPSU in LMI countries represented by Albania, Nepal, Tajikistan and Tanzania. In 
addition, it analyzes income-related inequality in physician service utilization and identifies its 
causes in those countries. In general, income is the major contributor followed by non-need-
related factors such as education, geography, distance to the doctors and ethnicity and then need-
related-factors to inequality in physician service utilization for chronic and general ill patients in 
all countries under study. In almost all cases, inequalities in needs are negative, thus implying 
that the impacts of treatment are pro-poor. However, the role of inequality due to residual term is 
mixed. The inequality due to residual is positive for chronically ill patient in Nepal in both 
models and is negative for Albania in all cases.  Results for Tajikistan and Tanzania are mixed. 
Summing up these results, the income-related inequality is pro-poor in Albania and pro-rich in 
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other countries except in Tanzania for chronically ill patients in total volume of physician use 
model.  That answers the first research question as to whether there is inequality in health care 
utilization in Albania, Nepal, Tajikistan and Tanzania.  
Next, it is interesting to discuss the causes of the inequalities. For chronic ill patients in 
Albania, the pro-rich inequality due to income and education is dominated by the pro-poor 
inequality due to need, non-need and residual terms such that the overall inequality is negative 
(pro-poor). In Nepal, pro-poor inequality is detected for chronically and generally ill patients in 
need-related-factors, which is dominated by the pro-rich inequality in income, education and 
non-need-related factors such that the overall inequality in physician service utilization is pro-
rich.  
The role of disparity in residual term is also countable in overall inequality in both of 
those countries. Relatively different trends are noted in both models for Tajikistan and Tanzania. 
In Tajikistan, pro-rich inequality in income, education and need factors among chronic and 
general ill patients are the significant contributor of overall pro-rich inequality in total volume of 
physician service utilization, and the pro-rich inequality in income factor is the major contributor 
of overall pro-rich inequality among general ill patient in the probability of use model. In 
Tanzania again, income is the major contributor of pro-rich IRIPSU in probability of the 
physician service utilization model and the pro-poor disparity in education; non-need-related 
factors and residual terms are the major contributors of pro-poor inequality in total volume of the 
physician service utilization model for chronic ill patients.  
The principle of ETEN is not fulfilled in all countries under study. The scope and content 
of the service coverage by all types of physicians as well as the uneven geographic distribution 
of health professionals (physicians) and the uneven distribution of income and education are the 
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major causes of the inequity in physician service utilization in these countries. At this point, it is 
interesting to compare the results of this paper with those of van Doorslaer et al (2000) who 
compare the results of horizontal equity in health care utilization in ten European countries and 
the US. In half of the countries of their study, significant pro-rich inequity was identified for 
physician contacts though most of those countries have universal coverage or almost universal 
coverage system in health care financing. Thus, it is not surprising to identify the inequity in 
physician service utilization in LMI countries represented by Albania, Nepal, Tajikistan and 
Tanzania where most of the health care is financed out-of-pocket and distribution of services is 
heavily skewed to the urban areas. 
Finally, the results presented in Table 8 supports Propositions 1 and 2. In both models, 
increases in average income or education do not always decrease income-related inequality in 
health care utilization. For example, a $100 increase in average income increases IRIPSU in 
Albania by 0.025 and in Tajikistan by 0.014 and reduces it by 0.031 in Nepal and 0.001 in 
Tanzania among chronic ill patient in total number of physician service utilization model.  
However, if the increase in average income or education can reduce the inequality in income and 
education first (i.e., if the re-distribution of income and education is more equitable than before), 
that increases can reduce inequality in health care utilization by the mechanism developed in 
equation (21) and (22). It is again interesting to compare my findings for LMI countries with 
those of Deaton (2002) for United States. Unlike his findings the existence of the gradient
2 
strengthens the case for income redistribution in favor of the poor, but targeting health 
inequalities would not be sound policy; my findings argue for re-distribution of income in favor   
                                                 
2
 Deaton (2002) defines gradient as “proportional increase in income is associated with equal proportional decrease 
in mortality throughout the income distribution”. 
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of poor help to reduce IRIPSU in LMI countries.  
The integrated approach of development is always stronger than the sectoral development  
policy for the reduction of IRIPSU if increases in average income and education reduce 
inequalities in income and education. For example, an average increase in income by $100 
increases IRIPSU by 0.05 and an average increase in education (average years of schooling) by 1 
year increases IRIPSU by 0.011 in Albania for chronic ill patients in probability of physician 
service utilization model (Table 8). However, if these increases first reduce the inequality in 
income and education, then that could reduce the gap ( )yCI CI  and ( )eCI CI . This could then 
automatically reduce CI as stated by the process in equations (21) and (22).  As integrated effect 
is simply the additive effect of single sectoral policy effect, it is definitely more powerful than 
the sectoral policy effect. 
5.5 Conclusion  
People with equal need for physician service are not treated equally in all of the countries 
under study. The supply side distribution of physician services is also not equitable. To reduce 
that inequality, the LMI countries need to make some distributional changes. Such redistributions 
would be desirable in income and education in favor of the poor and people who have been 
poorly served in physician service utilization. In addition, an integrated approach toward 
development reduces inequality in physician service utilization faster than a sectoral policy 
approach even if a given policy change reduces inequality in that policy variable. Thus, findings 
of this study call for some redistribution of income and education in order to achieve a 
sustainable reduction of IRIPSU.  
Utilization of physician services is not always determined by income, education, the 
need-based factors or the other factors considered in this study. The out-of-pocket financing for 
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physician service use has been a large portion of the cost of health care utilization in all 
countries. This suggests that health care use is likely affected by the price of health care services 
and the price of related goods, such as education and drugs. Identification of these factors (with 
sufficient data base) in health care use indicates directions for future research in this area.   
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Chapter 6 
Inequality in Education and Income 
Chapter 5 concludes that the inequality in health care utilization can be reduced by 
reducing inequality in education and income in LMI countries represented by Albania, Nepal, 
Tajikistan and Tanzania. This calls for the redistribution of income and education in favor of 
poor and less educated people. This chapter therefore concentrates on whether these countries 
can reduce inequality in income and education by redistributing income in favor of the poor and 
education in favor of less educated people.  Indeed, this chapter calculates the inequality in 
income and education by using income Gini and education concentration indices respectively. 
Then, it identifies the causes of those inequalities by decomposition analysis. Finally, a measure 
is proposed to estimate the effect of policy change on disparity in income and education. This 
measure is simply defined as the policy effect of disparity in income and education, respectively. 
Part A: Inequality in Education 
6.1 Data  
The study of education and income inequality are primarily based on the household 
survey data collected by the statistical office of the respective governments of Albania, Nepal, 
Tajikistan and Tanzania. Section 4.1 of Chapter 4 explains the sources and the nature of data. 
The descriptive statistics of the major variables used in the study of education and income 
inequality are presented in Table 9.  Time taken to school is measured in minutes. This variable 
is converted to log scale for analysis. Religion or ethnicity is a categorical variable measured in 1 
to 5 scales. Definition and features of other variables that are used for this study are presented in 
Table 9. 
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Table 9: Definition of Major Variables used with Means and Standard Deviations  
Variable and corresponding definition 
Statistics 
Albania Nepal Tajikistan Tanzania 
Income: Household income measured in terms of natural 
logarithm. Continuous variable. 
12.68 
(3.22) 
11.05 
(1.11) 
3.34 
(0.98) 
12.18 
(2.38) 
Education: Continuous variable, measured in years of 
schooling. 0 for illiterate to 20 for PhD completed. 
4.95 
(2.49) 
6.86 
(3.38) 
1.43 
(1.27) 
5.33 
(3.01) 
Self Access Health (SAH)*: Categorical variable 
measured in 1 to 5 scales. Excellent health = 1 and poor 
health = 5. 
1.53 
(0.73) 
1.34 
(0.49) 
1.96 
(0.49) 
2.93 
(0.64) 
Sex*: Sex of the individual (0 = female; 1= male) 
0.49 
(0.50) 
0.50 
(0.49) 
0.48 
(0.49) 
0.48 
(0.49) 
Age*: Age of the individual, in years. 15.53 
(5.27) 
14.76 
(5.64) 
15.15 
(5.51) 
21.25 
(18.25) 
Rural vs. Urban: 0 / 1 dummy variables. Rural = 0 and 
Urban = 1. 
0.519 
(0.499) 
0.81 
(0.39) 
0.29 
(0.45) 
-------- 
Time to School: Time taken to school in minutes 
transferred in to natural logarithm. Continuous variable. 
2.51 
(0.83) 
2.04 
(1.25) 
2.53     
(0. .67) 
2.09 
(1.55) 
Poverty Index: Continuous variable. Takes any values 
between 0 and 1. 
0.18 
(0.38) 
0.27 
(0.44) 
0.148 
(0.35) 
-------- 
Religion or Ethnicity: Categorical variable measured in 1 
to 5 scales. 
1.50 
(1.16) 
2.52 
(1.23) 
1.22 
(0.56) 
2.09 
(1.94) 
Source:- Calculated by Author. 
Note: - 1. * Represents the need variables. 
2. Numbers outside the parentheses are means and inside the parentheses are the standard 
deviations. 
6.2 Method 
The Education Demand Function: Demand for education, measured in terms of years of 
schooling, can be derived in a static utility maximization framework. A segment of individual 
age 6 years and above is enrolled in school at any point in time. Thus, all individuals are 
assumed to perceive themselves as a student or non-student at a particular time. The 
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representative consumer derives her utility from consuming a composite consumption good ( )C
and education services ( ) that flow from her stock of human capital (h0). The utility function 
can be simply written as: 
( , , )U U C O                    (23) 
where O represents the exogenous tastes and preferences of the individual consumer. 
U in equation (23) increases at a decreasing rate with respect to C and . Education 
services ( )  can be produced with varying combinations of school supplies (Q) and teacher 
services (S). But the production of   also depends on a host of other factors including the 
consumer’s initial endowment of human capital (h0); household characteristics such as 
landholding (lh), and the type and cost of dwelling (Cd); demographic characteristics such as age 
(a), sex (s),  health status (hs),  the level of adult education in the household (ea); social 
characteristics such as race (r), caste and ethnicity (et); geographic characteristics such as 
whether one lives in an urban or rural area (ur) and how far the nearest school is from home (the 
distance D ); and other factors such as opportunity cost of schooling measured in terms of wages 
(w) foregone and the current state of educational technology (T). Based on empirical 
considerations including data availability, I ignore a few “goods” and “bads” related to schooling 
such as school quality, school environment and peer effects. Assembling all the factors listed 
above leads to my production function for educational services, : 
0( , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , )h d s a t rQ S E h l C a s h e r e u D w T                 (24) 
where   is the education service production function and is assumed to be concave with respect 
to school supplies Q, years of education (E) of individual (i) and teacher services S  I assume that 
the consumer’s income net of taxes B, is fully spent on the purchase of the composite good C, 
and the other inputs in education service, Q, E and S. Equation (25) show this budget constraint: 
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c q e sB PC P Q P E P S                      (25) 
where Pc is the price of the composite good, Pq is the out-of-pocket price of school supplies, and 
Pe and Ps are the out-of-pocket price paid to the school (tuition and fees).   
The representative consumer’s optimization problem is to maximize utility:  
 
 0
, , ,
, ( , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ),h d s a t r
C Q E S
c q e s
Max U U C Q S E h B l C a s h e r e u D w T O
subject to PC P Q P E P S
 
     
            (26) 
 Solving this utility maximization problem yields the consumer demand function for 
school supplies Q, and educational services, . The typical demand for education can thus be 
identified as a function of real income B/Pc, the relative prices of Q, E and S 
(that is, and )q c e c s cP P P P P P    and all other factors discussed above, where Pc is the price of 
the numeraire good. For notational simplicity, I drop the division by Pc from the relative price 
and income variables which appear together with other factors in my full specification of the 
demand for education (equation 29): 
( , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , )q s o h d s a t rE E P P B O h l C a s h e r e u D w T               (27) 
where income and prices are real income and relative prices. The demand for education is 
determined by the out-of-pocket direct cost of school (tuition, fees and school supplies), the 
consumer’s real income, and other factors. Redefining the demand for education E as y to make 
the notation for the dependent variable more intuitive, the function can be written for an 
econometric analysis in a compact form as in equation (28):  
(  )i iy f X                      (28) 
where iy  is the demand for education and is measured in terms of the years of schooling for 
individual i ,  iX  is the vector of household characteristics, demographic characteristics, social 
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characteristics, geographic information, the opportunity cost of schooling and some interaction 
terms for individual i . Thus, iX  is the vector of covariates in the demand for education for 
individual i , and   is the coefficient vector. 
To determine the effects of the covariates on the years of schooling, I apply both the 
weighted least squares ( )WLS and ordinary least squares ( )OLS regressions. WLS helps by 
removing problems associated with some types of heteroscedasticity. Although the two methods 
yield similar results, I nevertheless report the results of each method for policy exercises. For 
analytical ease, I regroup the covariates into two broad categories in equation (29): 
0
1 1
 1  2
j m
i k ki k ki i
k k j
Term Term
y X X   
  
                      (29) 
where iy , the demand for education by individual i, can take any discrete values from 0 for no 
schooling to 20  for the highest degree such as a Ph.D. The covariates kiX  in Term 1 represent 
the “need for education” variables such as age, sex and health status of individual  , and the 
covariates kiX  in Term 2 represent other explanatory variables (referred to as “non-need” factors 
hereafter) appearing in equation (27) above
3
. The error term   is assumed to follow a normal 
distribution and therefore the model can be estimated using both OLS and WLS.   
Calculation and Decomposition of Education Inequality: The estimation of the 
education demand function permits the decomposition of the education concentration index 
( )ECI among the covariates of education demand. The calculation and decomposition of 
                                                 
3
 Thus the need for education would arise regardless of age, sex or health. For a person between, say, 6 and 18 years 
of age, there is need for education regardless of whether the person is  male or female, or healthy or sick. This 
dissertation extends that age up to 25 years. 
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education inequality follows exactly the same method that is used for the calculation and 
decomposition of inequality in health care utilization in section 5.2 of chapter five.  
Further, the current research examines whether the distribution of schooling facilities is 
equitable in the countries under study. Following Bourguignon et al (2007) definition of equity
4
, 
I measure equity in education using the horizontal inequity ( )HI index proposed by van 
Doorslaer et al (2000).  The HI index is obtained by subtracting inequality due to the need 
factors from the overall concentration index in education.  
Measurement of Policy Effect: Finally, the effect of change in policy variables on 
disparity in education is measured by the similar mechanism as that used to measure the effect of 
policy change on health care disparity. Likewise, we can state and test the exact same hypothesis 
too in this sub-section (for details see section 5.2 of Chapter 5).  
 Any change in the policy variable mean kX  has two effects:  
 The direct effect: This occurs through the elasticity of demand for education ( )ke , the 
mean kX  and kCI . Since 0kX  , inequality in education will increase with increase in kX  if ke  
and  )( ECICI k   are either positive or both negative and decrease otherwise. The sign of the 
elasticity ke  depends on the sign of estimated k , the coefficient of 
thk covariate in equation 
(29). This result is stated in the first proposition:  
Proposition 1: An increase in average kX does not always reduce IRIE even though it 
increases the average level of education, that is, even though 0k   . 
Proof: It follows similar arguments and approaches that are applied to prove the 
proposition 1 of section 5.2 in chapter five. 
                                                 
4
 This encompasses two basic principles: (a) equal opportunities and (b) avoidance of extreme deprivation in 
outcomes. 
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Proposition 2: A decrease in average kX does not always reduce IRIE even though it 
increases the average level of education, that is, even though 0k   . 
Proof: It follows similar arguments and approaches that are applied to prove the 
proposition 1 of section 5.2 in chapter five. 
The indirect effect:  The indirect effect of a change in average kX occurs through the 
concentration index of education (ECI) via average level of education.  A rise in average kX  
increases education if 0k . In this case ECI increases and hence the effect is pro-rich. If 
0k , however, an increase in mean kX reduces ECI  making the distribution pro-poor.  
The total effect:   The total effect of an increase in mean kX is the sum of the direct and 
indirect effects. This depends on whether kX is more unequally distributed than education (i.e., 
whether )( ECICI k   is positive or negative). An increase in average kX can reduce IRIE if and 
only if it reduces inequality in kX . This leads to Proposition 3: 
Proposition 3: An integrated approach toward development is always stronger than the 
sectoral development policy for the reduction of IRIE, provided an increase in average kX
reduces inequality in kX .  
Proof: It follows similar arguments and approaches that are applied to prove the 
proposition 1 of section 5.2 in Chapter 5. 
6.3 Results 
 Inequality and Inequity in Education: The education concentration indices calculated 
for the population aged 6 to 25 years in Albania, Nepal, Tajikistan, and Tanzania are reported in 
Table 10. Since the calculation of horizontal inequity (HI) indices are associated with estimated 
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coefficients of the education demand function, the ECI and HI indices reported in Table 10 are 
calculated for OLS and WLS models separately. All of the concentration indices in both models 
are statistically significant at the 1 percent level, except for Albania where ECI  is significant at 
the 5 percent level. Obviously, the null of zero ECI is rejected for all countries under study.  
The ECI numbers, however, show substantial disparity across nations. The two countries 
from the Eastern Europe and sub-Saharan Africa display more even distribution of education 
than the two from the Central Asia and South Asia. The ECIs from Albania and Tanzania (about 
0.01) are closer to zero, whereas the ECI from Nepal is 0.09 and hence pro-rich. Tajikistan is an 
intermediate case with an ECI of about 0.04. Note that, as explained in section 6.2, the measure 
of ECI is based on the income ordering of the households. A zero value for ECI signifies 
neutrality, whereas a positive (negative) value indicates a pro-rich (pro-poor) distribution.  
Secondly, when we eliminate from ECI the influence of the “need” factors on education 
demand, we arrive at horizontal inequity in education (HI). This measure reflects the effects of 
income, time to school and urban or rural location of the household. The HI  indices are all 
positive which suggests pro-rich inequity in the delivery of education services
5
. Hence, the 
principle of equal schooling for equal need (ESEN) does not find strong support in Albania, 
Nepal, Tajikistan or Tanzania. 
As with ECI, I find a substantial variation in HI across countries. The non-need factors 
that determine HI essentially account for most of the inequity in Nepal and Tajikistan where 
ECIs are the highest. Nepal’s share of the non-need factors in ECI exceeds 90 percent and in 
Tajikistan this share is over two-thirds. In contrast, the non-need factors are relatively 
inconsequential in Albania or Tanzania where these factors account for less than a quarter of 
ECI.  
                                                 
5
 The  indices are all statistically significant at the 1 percent level in all countries. 
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Table 10: Inequality and Inequity in Education 
     Countries ECI+ 95% CI HI+ 95% CI 
OLS Model 
Albania 0.0093 0.0092 to 0.0097 0.0016 0.0014 to 0.0019 
Nepal 0.0905 0.0903 to 0.0910 0.0837 0.0834 to 0.0841 
Tajikistan 0.0373 0.0370 to 0.0377 0.0252 0.0249 to 0.0255 
     
Tanzania 0.0126 0.0124 to 0.0129 0.0029 0.0027 to 0.0032 
WLS Model 
Albania 0.0093 0.0090 to 0.0095 0.0017 0.0014 to 0.0019 
Nepal 0.0905 0.0902 to 0.909 0.0831 0.0827 to 0.0834 
Tajikistan 0.0373 0.0370 to 0.0377 0.0254 0.0251 to 0.0258 
Tanzania 0.0126 0.0123 to 0.0128 0.003 0.0028 to 0.0033 
Source: - Calculated by Author.  
+
 All ECI and HI numbers are statistically significant.  
ECI: Education Concentration Index. HI: Horizontal Inequality Index. 
Decomposition Analysis: Income-related inequality in education as calculated in Table 
10 could be attributed to various factors indicated in equation (29). These effects can be positive 
or negative. It is possible that these contributions could cancel each other out leaving inequality 
constant. Thus, looking at Figure 2, if education services were utilized equally across income 
groups, the bar segments above and below the zero line would be mutually offsetting. Yet, even 
in the case of perfect equity, variations in the personal characteristics of households could 
generate a “need” segment in each of the bars. Since this paper considers inequality among 
households ranked by income, any discrepancy between actual and need-based distributions 
would indicate either a direct contribution of income (or distance to school or ‘urban’) or its 
effect through other non-need factors.  
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Figure 2: Decomposition of Education Inequality 
 
Alb.: Albania, Nep.: Nepal,  Taj.: Tajikistan, and Tan.: Tanzania. 
The decomposition analysis confirms that income does play a significant role in affecting 
education inequality in all of the sample countries. In Albania, Tajikistan and Tanzania, income 
is followed by location factors and then by need factors. However, in the case of Tajikistan and 
Tanzania the role of the error term, possibly reflecting some missing variables, is substantial. In 
Nepal, ECI is mainly affected by non-need factors which are followed by income and then by 
need group. Non-need factors in Nepal, such as poverty, ethnicity and the housing cost, the last 
of which is a measure of socio-economic status of individual households, seem to have a 
significant impact on inequality in education.  
Policy Effects: To determine the significance of the inequality effects of the policies 
undertaken on the X-variables, I applied a bootstrapping technique with 1000 iterations. I 
calculated the effects of income, location, time to school and self-access health (SAH), 95 
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percent confidence intervals, t-stats and p-values. The effects of these factors appear in Table 11. 
In all cases, the effects on education inequality are statistically significant at the 5 percent level 
for all countries under study.  
Starting with income, I ask: What happens to educational inequality when the mean 
income increases by $100? I find that for the OLS model this increase reduces income-related 
inequality in education in Albania and Nepal by 0.05 and 0.022 respectively and increases such 
inequality by 0.0021 and 0.21 respectively in Tajikistan and Tanzania. The impact in Tanzania is 
apparently large, but that is because almost 40 percent of education inequality in that country is 
attributable to income. Thus, increasing the average income by $100 in Tanzania is a way that 
reduces income inequality which could also have a greater effect on reducing education 
inequality than in other countries.   
Similarly, urbanization of a society significantly reduces inequality in all countries in 
both models except in Albania under OLS. Such a reduction is likely due to better access to 
schooling in urban areas even for the poor
6
. The effects of distance to school measured in terms 
of travel time are significant in all countries and both models. For example, under OLS, reducing 
the travel time to school by 10 minutes reduces inequality by 0.00, 0.013 and 0.014, respectively 
in Albania, Tajikistan and Tanzania, but increases inequality by 0.01 in Nepal
7
. However, in the  
WLS model this policy reduces inequality by 0.00, 0.01, 0.005 and 0.014, respectively in 
Albania, Nepal, Tajikistan and Tanzania. Another variable, self-access health (SAH), is a 
                                                 
6
 Again this is specific to my sample countries. Migration to cities in some countries (e.g., China) is highly 
discouraged by making it illegal for migrants to work without a permit or through a ban on school enrollment for 
children of migrant workers in cities where work permits are enforced. In those countries a reduction in education 
inequality due to urbanization may not occur. 
7
 Note that Albania does not show any notable change. 
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categorical variable that takes values from 1 to 5 where 1 indicates ‘excellent or very good’ 
health and 5 indicates ‘very poor’ health. Thus, if countries can work to improve the general 
health conditions of the public, say by reducing SAH by one on average, inequality in education 
will likely decline in all countries except in Albania. This impact varies, according to the WLS 
model, from a low of 0.0002 in Tanzania to a high of 0.01 in Nepal.  
These findings verify Propositions 1 and 2 that a suitable change (increase/decrease) in 
the covariates of the education demand function does not always decrease income-related 
inequality in education. However, if a suitable redistribution of covariates of the education 
demand function reduces inequality in the same covariates first, such a reduction in the 
covariate-specific inequality would in turn reduce inequality in education through the mechanism 
proposed in section 6.2.  
Taking income distribution first, programs that enhance the efficiency of rural farmers 
and the productivity of urban poor will likely reduce inequality in education by causing 
improvements in the income Gini. An improvement in income distribution tends to improve the 
overall health situation in a country (Subramanian, S. V., 2004)
8
.  In turn, health is correlated 
positively with education and thus presumably alleviates disparity in education. In my model, the 
covariate-specific inequality reduction in income could possibly be achieved by promoting the 
use of modern inputs and by training rural farmers on some of the modern techniques of farming. 
In urban areas, some provision of vocational training and micro credit for poor residents could 
help them start a small family business and contribute to lowering inequality (Hisako, K., 
Hamori, S., 2009). The essence of this argument is that a reduction in outcome variable, 
education inequality, will necessitate a suitable redistribution of the contributing factors in such 
                                                 
8
 Their study shows an inverse relationship between income inequality and population health. 
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a way that there is a reduction in inequality in those factors. That could automatically reduce 
inequality in education. 
6.4 Discussion 
In Albania, Tajikistan and Tanzania, the major contributor to education inequality is 
income followed by urban vs. rural and need factors. However, in Tajikistan and Tanzania the 
role of factors not captured by my model and reflected in the error term is also substantial. In 
Nepal, the effect on ECI attributable to income and need is secondary to those other factors.  
I find that inequalities in the need variables are positive implying that the distribution of 
the need factors is skewed toward the rich segment of the society and hence the inequality is pro-
rich. Similarly, results indicate that inequality due to income is also pro-rich in all cases except 
under OLS for Albania. Summing up these results, the income-related inequality in education is 
found to be pro-rich in all countries, and this answers the first research question.  
Second, the principle of equal schooling for equal need (ESEN) is not fulfilled in any of 
the countries under study. Limited coverage of teacher’s services, uneven geographic distribution 
of schools, and generally low incomes of the public are the major causes of inequity in education 
in low and middle income (LMI) countries represented by Albania, Nepal, Tajikistan and 
Tanzania. I note, however, that the inequity is more severe in Nepal and is somewhat less in 
Tajikistan, whereas Albania and Tanzania exhibit only a mild degree of inequity. 
Finally, the results presented in Table 11 support my Propositions 1 and 2. Changes in 
factors affecting inequality, particularly average income, urban vs. rural, time to school and self-
access health measures do not always reduce income-related inequality in education. For 
example, a $100 increase in the average income under OLS decreases IRIE in Albania and Nepal 
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by 0.005 and 0.022 respectively. However, an equal increase in income increases IRIE in all 
other cases under study. Likewise, greater urbanization reduces IRIE in Nepal, Tajikistan and 
Tanzania in both models but increases IRIE in Albania. Even desirable changes in the covariates 
of education demand function do not always reduce IRIE in my sample countries. On the other 
hand, if a redistribution of a particular covariate in the education demand function reduces its 
own inequality, then a change in that covariate will be needed to reduce IRIE.  
I find that an integrated approach toward development is always stronger than the 
sectoral development policy for the reduction of IRIE. For example, raising average incomes by 
$100, inducing greater urbanization by 0.2 (20 percentage points), and improving average SAH 
condition by 1 reduces IRIE by 0.006, 0.005 and 0.01 respectively in the WLS model for Nepal. 
However, an integrated effect of a simultaneous change in those factors will reduce inequality by 
0.021 which turns out to be a large portion (23 percent) of IRIE in Nepal. This result supports my 
Proposition 3. 
6.5 Conclusion 
This paper proposes a clear method to determine what I call the policy effect of 
inequality and examines how changes in the determinants of the education demand function 
reduce educational inequality in the four countries under study. In addition, it identifies the 
causes of income-related inequality in education in those countries. 
On the demand side, those with equal need for schooling are not found in the sample 
countries to have equal access to schooling. The supply side distribution of schools and 
education services is also not found to be equitable. To reduce that inequality, results indicate 
that the low to middle income countries that I study need to make some distributional changes. 
Such redistributions would be desirable in income and other non-need factors in favor of the 
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poor and in favor of those who have been poorly served in education. In addition, an integrated 
approach toward development reduces educational inequality faster than a sectoral policy 
approach even if a given sectoral policy change reduces inequality in the same policy variable. 
Thus, my findings call for some redistribution of income, a greater provision of urban amenities 
to rural areas, and a shortening of the distance to school in order to achieve a sustainable 
reduction of IRIE in a wide variety of regions that my sample countries represent.  
Utilization of education services is not always determined by income, need-based factors 
and other factors considered in my model. Out-of-pocket financing for education has been a 
large fraction of the cost of education in my sample countries. This suggests that schooling is 
likely affected by the price of education services and the price of related goods such as health. 
Identification of those factors in schooling indicates one possible direction for future research in 
this area.  
Part B: Inequality in Income 
Chapter 5 concludes that the inequality in health care utilization can be reduced by 
reducing inequality in education and income in LMI countries represented by Albania, Nepal, 
Tajikistan and Tanzania. This calls for the redistribution of income and education in favor of 
poor and less educated people. This sub-chapter therefore concentrates on whether those 
countries can reduce inequality in income.  Indeed, this sub-chapter calculates the inequality in 
income using income Gini. Then, it identifies the causes of inequality by decomposition analysis. 
Finally, it proposes a measure to estimate the effect of policy change to reduce disparity in 
income. This measure is simply defined as-the policy effect of disparity in income. 
This section is classified into the four sub-sections. Section 6.6, discusses the data and 
method used for the calculation of income inequality in brief, its decomposition and the method 
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to measure the policy effect for the reduction of inequality in income. Research findings are 
briefly presented in section 6.7. Finally, section 6.8 concludes the findings. 
6.6  Data and Method 
As explained in Chapter 4 (section 4.1), this study is primarily based on the household 
survey data collected by the statistical office of the respective government of Albania, Nepal, 
Tajikistan and Tanzania. The details of the sources of data used for the analysis made in this 
chapter are discussed in Chapter 4 (section 4.1).  
I calculate the income inequality by using Gini index. Inequality in income is then 
decomposed into the determinants of income using a broad list of classification: socio-economic, 
geographic and demographic. Finally, comparative statistic is used to develop the policy effect 
on disparity. The generalized version of the methodology used in this sub-section is detailed in 
section 4.2 of Chapter 4. 
6.7 Results 
Inequality in Income: The income Gini calculated for the populations aged 6 years and 
above in Albania, Nepal, Tajikistan, and Tanzania are reported in Table 12. The value of Gini 
lies between 0 to 1. A zero Gini implies for perfect equity and higher Gini implies for higher 
inequality. The Gini indices (GIs) reported in Table 12 are calculated for log (income) and then 
transferred into the income Gini. All of the Gini indices reported in Table 12 are statistically 
significant at better than 1 percent significance level. Thus, null hypothesis of zero GI is rejected 
for all countries under study.  
Decomposition Analysis: Income inequality, as calculated in Table 12 for Albania, 
Nepal, Tajikistan and Tanzania, could be divided into different attributes, such as education, self 
access health (SAH) measures, land holding, occupation, urban vs. rural, age, sex, 
84 
 
 
ethnicity/religion and the error term as indicated by the determinants of income given in income 
equation. The decomposition equation shows that the income Gini is the weighted average of the 
concentration indices of these attributes. The weights are the respective semi-elasticities as 
defined in section 4.2 of Chapter 4. Thus, the contribution of those attributes on income 
inequality may be positive or negative. These positive and negative contributions could cancel 
each other so that the aggregate contribution could be positive for income Gini.   
Table 12: Income Inequality 
Countries 
Gini Index 
of log(inc) 
Valuep  95% Confidence Interval  
Transferred Gini 
(Income Gini) 
Albania 0.0472 0.0000 0.0467 to 0.0477 0.5136 
Nepal 0.0500 0.0000 0.0496 to 0.0504 0.4950 
Tajikistan 0.0905 0.0000 0.0897 to 0.0913 0.4747 
Tanzania 0.0864 0.0000 0.0857 to 0.0870 0.7384 
Source: - Calculated by Author.  
  The decomposition analysis confirms that the inequality in income in all of the countries 
under study is extensively affected by the socio-economic factors, such as education, health 
status, occupation status and land holding followed by the geographic location of the individual 
(i.e., whether an individual is urban or rural residence and then by demographic factors, such as 
sex, age and ethnicity or religion). The influence of other factors those are not captured by the 
income equation of this study such as: wage, remittance, institutions, liberalization, 
globalization, etc, is very important for the reduction of inequality in income. Thus, the 
contribution of residual term in income inequality is very large for all countries under study. The 
details of the contribution of various factors are listed in Table 13. My study confirms that rather 
than the socio-economic, demographic and geographic factors, the contribution of other factors 
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in income inequality is prominent in low and middle income countries represented by Albania, 
Nepal, Tajikistan and Tanzania. 
Table 13: Decomposition Results 
Countries Socio-economic Geographic Demographic Other 
Albania 0.0035 0.0016 0.0001 0.042 
% Contribution 7.51 3.37 0.12 89.0 
Nepal 0.0053 0.0013 0.0003 0.0432 
% Contribution 10.55 2.52 0.61 86.31 
Tajikistan 0.0008 0.0002 0.0003 0.1473 
% Contribution 0.53 0.14 0.20 99.14 
Tanzania 0.0054 0.0015 0.0003 0.0911 
% Contribution 5.54 1.51 0.34 92.61 
Source:- Calculated by Author. 
Policy Effect: The bootstrapping technique (with 1000 iterations) is used to calculate the effect of 
education, self-access health (SAH), land holding, occupation and geographic location of an 
individual on inequality in income, their 95 percent confidence interval, t-stat and their p-values. The 
calculated values of effects of average changes (increase or decrease as is favorable) in the 
covariates of the income equation are presented in Table 14. In all of the cases, effects are 
statistically significant at better than 5 percent significant level. Thus, the null hypothesis of zero 
impact is rejected in all cases and all countries under study. This means an average change 
(favorable change) in education, SAH, land holding, occupation and geographic location can 
significantly reduce or increase income inequality. 
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Among the four countries under study, increase in average years of schooling by one or 
more years increases inequality in income by 0.005 in Albania and 0.0096 in Tajikistan, whereas 
it decrease inequality by 0.0275 and 0.032 respectively in Nepal and Tanzania. Unlike the effect 
of education, improving average health status of the individual (i.e., moving from 5 to 4 or from  
4 to 3) decreases inequality in all countries under study significantly. The effects are reported in 
Table 14. 
The effects of land holding, occupation and geographic locations are mixed. For example, 
increasing average land holdings of the individual by increasing cropping intensity (changing 
farming system from 1 time a year to 2-3 times a year) increases the inequality in income in all 
countries under study; however, increase in average employment status decreases inequality in 
income in Albania, Nepal, and Tanzania significantly. Increasing urbanization is another 
significant factor that can decrease inequality significantly in Nepal, Tajikistan and Tanzania. 
However in all of these cases, if the countries under study significantly reduce inequality 
in each of the covariates of the income equation, then that could automatically reduce inequality 
in income. Thus, sustainable reduction of inequality in income requires the redistribution of 
education and land. It also calls for the improvement of self-access health condition of the poor 
health status population, increasing employment among unemployed and fast urbanization in 
poor countries. 
These finding proves the statement of Proposition 1: Increase in average value of 
covariates of income equation does not always decrease income inequality. However, if the re-
distribution of covariates of the income equation reduces the inequality in those covariates that 
could automatically reduce inequality in income by the process proposed in this research.  The 
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integrated effect is the sum of education and other effects discussed above. Thus, it is always   
greater than the single sectoral policy effect in absolute terms. That justifies Proposition 2.  
6.8  Discussion  
  This dissertation research proposes a clear mechanism to measure the policy effect on 
inequality, called policy effect of inequality, and examines how appropriate change in the 
covariates of the income equation reduce income Gini in LMI countries represented by Albania, 
Nepal, Tajikistan and Tanzania. In addition, it analyzes the causes of income inequality in those 
countries. In all of the countries under study, socio-economic factors are the major contributors 
to income inequality followed by urban vs. rural and demographic factors in Albania, Nepal, 
Tajikistan and Tanzania. However, in all cases the role of error term is prominent and implies 
that the other factors such as wage, remittance, liberalization, globalization, institutions, etc; 
should have a prominent impact on income inequality.  
Finally, the result presented in Table 14 supports the Propositions 1 and 2. In all 
countries under study the results of policy effect is mixed. Simply an average increase in some of 
the policy variables reduces inequality in income while in other cases it increases inequality. For 
example, increase in average years of schooling by one year decreases inequality in income in all 
countries except in Albania, and all of the effects are statistically significant. We can make a 
similar interpretation for rest of the policy effects analysis. However, if the redistribution of the 
covariates of the income equation reduces the inequality within that covariate, then an 
appropriate change in that covariate could automatically reduce IG as explained by the process 
developed in equation (11) of Chapter 4. For example, if those countries reduce inequality in 
land holding by increasing the farming land by providing year-round irrigation facilities and 
enhancing cropping intensity, it could reduce inequality in land holding. Likewise, a focused 
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policy to reduce the school dropout rate of poor children in LMI countries would significantly 
reduce inequality in education.  Such policies automatically reduce inequality in income. 
These findings call for the redistribution of education in favor of less educated people, 
improvement of general health conditions of the poor health people, redistribution of the land in 
favor of poor farmers, increased access to employment to the unemployed and improvements of 
rural areas to urban for the sustainable reduction of income inequality in LMI countries. 
The integrated approach of development is always stronger than the sectoral development 
policy for the reduction of income inequality if appropriate change in covariates of income 
equation reduces inequalities in those covariates. For example, an increase in average years of 
schooling by one year reduces the Gini index by 0.0275 in Nepal. However, the integrated policy 
of improving education, improving the average SAH condition by one, improving employment 
or occupation status by one and changing societies from rural to urban reduces GI by 0.0275, 
0.043, 0.0174 and 0.0071 respectively in Nepal.  The integrated effect is thus 0.095 which is 
significantly larger than the single sectoral policy effect. However, simply increasing land 
holding by 1 hectare in Nepal increases inequality in income. Thus, Nepal should redistribute 
land in such a way that could reduce inequality in land holding first. That policy could then 
automatically reduce inequality in income in this poor country by the mechanism proposed in 
equation (11) of Chapter 4.  
6.9 Conclusion 
Inequality in income exists in all of the four countries under study. To reduce that 
inequality, the LMI countries have to redistribute education and other covariates of the income 
equation in favor of poor and poorly-served people. This could automatically reduce inequality 
in income by the mechanism developed in equation (11) of Chapter 4.  In addition, integrated 
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approaches of development reduce that inequality faster than the individual sectoral policy 
approach if the average effect of appropriate changes in sectoral policy variable reduces 
inequality in that variable. Thus, sustainable reduction requires redistribution of education and 
other policy variables in favor of poor and less-served people of the societies in LMI countries.  
Income is not only determined by the socio-economic, geographic and demographic 
factors listed in the income equation. It is equally or more importantly affected by wage, 
remittance, institutions, liberalization, and globalization. Availability of systematic data on these 
variables helps to extend this paper to test the effect of average improvement of these variables 
on inequality in income.  Thus, it could be an interesting area for exploration.  
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Chapter 7 
Summary, Conclusion and Recommendations 
7.1  Summary 
Using the household survey data of LMI countries represented by Albania, Nepal, 
Tajikistan and Tanzania, my current research identifies sustainable policies that can reduce 
inequality in health care utilization, education and income. Among those four countries, Albania 
is a middle income country, and Nepal, Tajikistan and Tanzania are low income countries. Based 
upon the statement of the problems discussed in section 1.2, Chapter 1, fundamentally defines 
the research objectives. Chapter 2 basically established the fundamental reasoning of why this 
research focused on LMI countries represented by Albania, Nepal, Tajikistan and Tanzania. 
Brief reviews of literature associated with inequality in health, education, income, and inequality 
and growth are presented in Chapter 3. The current research develops the generalized version of 
methodology in Chapter 4. This is used for specific cases in Chapters 5 and 6 for the calculation 
and interpretation of inequality in health care utilization, and education and income respectively. 
Chapter 5 identifies the sustainable policies to reduce disparity in health care utilization 
in LMI countries represented by Albania, Nepal, Tajikistan and Tanzania. It calculates the 
income-related inequality in physician service utilization and inequity in physician service 
delivery and then tests whether the increase in average income and education reduces those 
inequalities. 
In the last two decades, many have studied income-related inequality in health care 
utilization, equity in health care delivery, equity in health care finance, and inequalities in health 
(for example, van Doorslaer et al, 1997, 2000, 2004; Wagstaff and van Doorslaer, 1993; 
Wagstaff and van Doorslaer, 1998; Wagstaff, 2002; Lu et al, 2007).  Most have focused on 
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calculation and interpretation of inequalities for high-income industrial countries. Van Doorslaer 
and O’Donnell, (2008) did a similar study of LMI countries focusing fundamentally on 
inequality in health care financing. Thus, there are few studies that calculate and interpret the 
income-related inequalities in health care utilization focusing on LMI countries. In that sense, a 
similar study that calculates the inequality in health care utilization and inequity in health care 
delivery system that is focused on LMI countries is useful for policy perspective and for future 
researchers.  
Further, Deaton (2002) argues that proportional increases in income are associated with 
equal proportional decreases in mortality throughout income distribution. Many economic 
models of health such as Grossman (1972) argued that education enhances a person’s efficiency 
and produces better health. The empirical evidence such as that made by Elo and Preston (1996), 
on the other hand, shows that education protects health.  
From this evidence, it is clear that income and education either separately or jointly affect 
population health and health care use. To understand how the changes in income and education 
affect inequality in health and health care utilization, we need a well-defined mechanism to 
establish the relationship among all three. Deaton (2002) also argues that “policy cannot be 
intelligently conducted without an understanding of mechanisms; correlations are not enough”. 
To the best of my knowledge, there is no such mechanism yet proposed to quantify the effect of 
policy change on inequality in health.  By developing a formula to quantify the effect of policy 
change on health care disparity, my study also fulfills that vacuum of the existing literature. 
Likewise, parts A and B of Chapter 6 design the sustainable policies that can reduce 
inequality in education and income respectively. For the first time in the literature, part A of 
Chapter 6 applies a concentration index for the calculation of inequality in education measured in 
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terms of years of schooling and horizontal inequity index identify for the measurement of 
inequity in education. Finally, using the same formula that is proposed to measure the policy 
effect on disparity in health care utilization, the effect of policy change on disparity of education 
is calculated and analyzed for the policy perspective.  
Unlike the existing practice of decomposition of income Gini, part B of this research in 
Chapter 6, for the first time in the literature, uses regression-based total differential 
decomposition of income inequality among the determinants of households income. However, 
this decomposition technique was proposed by Wagstaff et al (2003) and widely applied for the 
decomposition of income-related inequality in health. Finally, using the same formula proposed 
in Chapter 4 to measure the effect of policy change on disparity, I calculate the policy effect of 
inequality in income.  
7.2 Conclusion 
This section concludes the findings of Chapters 5 and 6. Chapter 5 concentrates on the 
calculation and interpretation of income-related inequality in physician service utilization. Based 
upon the results obtained in Chapter 5, I conclude that statistically significant inequality exists in 
all countries under study. Equals are not treated equally and the distribution of physician service is 
not equitable. Simply increasing income and education may not reduce inequality in health care 
utilization. However, if the low and middle income countries redistribute income and education in 
favor of poor and less educated people respectively, that could automatically reduce inequality in 
health care utilization by the mechanism proposed in equations (21) and (22) of section 5.2 in 
Chapter 5.  
Likewise, Chapter 6 concludes that the education and income inequality are both significant 
in all countries under study. Further, the principal of equal schooling for equal need is not fulfilled. 
To reduce that inequality, results indicate that the low to middle income countries need to make 
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some distributional changes. Such redistributions would be desirable in income and other non-
need factors in favor of the poor and those poorly served in education. Thus, my findings call for 
some redistribution of income, a greater provision of urban amenities to rural areas, and a 
shortening of the distance to school in order to achieve a sustainable reduction of IRIE in a wide 
variety of regions that my sample countries represent.  
Finally, the result in part B of Chapter 6 shows significant inequality in income. To 
reduce that inequality, the LMI countries have to redistribute education and other covariates of 
the income equation in favor of poor and poorly served people. This could automatically reduce 
inequality in income by the mechanism proposed in equation (11) of Chapter 4.   
For all cases, an integrated approach toward development reduces inequality faster than a 
sectoral policy approach if a given sectoral policy change reduces inequality in the same policy 
variable.  
7.3 Recommendations 
There exists a vicious vs. virtuous circle of inequality among health, education and income. 
For example, if an average increase in income and education reduce inequality in income and 
education respectively, it could automatically reduce inequality in health care utilization. A virtuous 
circle exists. However, if those increases enhance the inequality in income and education than it 
could automatically enhance inequality in health care utilization. A vicious circle exists. 
My current research does not test whether the sustainable policies proposed in Chapter 5 and 
6 to reduce inequality in health, education, and income are cost-effective. If it is cost-effective, the 
best channel for intervention could be selected. If not, the identification of next best alternative(s) 
could be a good extension of my work. Upon the availability of data, one can further answers those 
questions, which are highly useful for the cost-effective and sustainable policy formulation to reduce 
inequality in LIM countries. 
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The out-of-pocket financing for physician service use and schooling has been a large part of 
the cost of health care utilization and schooling in all countries. In such circumstances, the 
availability of price data would help to identify the effectiveness of a pricing policy in the reduction 
of disparity in health care utilization and education. This could be another extension of my work. 
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APPENDIX 1: DERIVATION OF POLICY EFFECT OF DISPARITY - GENERALIZED 
VERSION 
We have from equation (9) 
 1  2  3
j
j j j j j
Term Term Term
dCIdCI CI dCI d dCI
dx x d dx dCI dx


    
    
        
     
          
                      (a) 
Term 3 in equation (a) is 0 because proportionate change in xj does not change inequality on xj. 
Solving Term 1:- 
Differentiating equation (7) with respect to jx  we get 
j
j
j
CI
CI
x


 
  
  
                 (b) 
Solving Term 2:- 
Since the estimated value of iy  (demand for education) at means is given by:  
0
1
m
j j
j
x  

                              (c) 
Differentiate equation (7) of the main text w.r.t.   and get 
dCI
d
.Similarly, differentiating 
equation (c) w.r.t. jx  and get 
j
d
dx

. That yields the following result: 
2 2
1
1m j j
j j
jj
xdCI d
CI GC
d dx



  
  
       
  
              (d) 
So, Term 2
1
1mj j j j
j
j
x
CI GC CI
  
   
  
        
  
  
Thus, equation (a) becomes: 
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j j
j
j
dCI
CI CI
dx
 
 
   
      
   
 
j
j
j
dCI
CI CI
dx


                                 (e) 
Since, j
j
d
dx

  by differentiating equation (c) w.r.t.
 j
x . Also, multiplying RHS of equation (e) 
by 
j
j
x
x
. Then, equation (e) can be written as: 
j j j
j
j j j j
x CI CI CI CIdCI d
e
dx dx x x


    
     
      
               (f) 
which is equation (11) in the text. As a special case of this generalized version, an application is 
derived for policy effect on disparity on health care utilization in Appendix 2. 
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APPENDIX 2: DERIVATION OF POLICY EFFECT OF DISPARITY ON HEALTH 
CARE UTILIZATION 
Equation (19) is:  
 1  2  3
ln ln ln
ln ln ln
y
y
Term Term Term
dCIdCI CI d Y dCI d d Y dCI d Y
dY Y dY d d Y dY dCI d Y dY


   
   
                    
                   (a) 
Term (3) of equation (a) is zero because proportionate increase in income does not change 
the income inequality.  
Solving Term 1:- 
1ln
ln
y
CI Y
CI
Y Y Y


  
      
 
Solving Term 2:-  
ln
ln
dCI d d Y
d d Y dY


  1 2
12 2 2 2
(ln ) 1p pk k
y e k p
k p
xxY E
CI CI CI CI
Y
 

   
      
            
          
   
 Differentiate equation (18) w.r.t.   and get
dCI dCI
d d 
 .  Since the estimated value of  
iM   at means is given by: 0 1 2ln k k p p
k p
Y E x x           , where Y  mean of income 
and E  mean of education. Differentiating this equation w.r.t. Y, we get 
ln
d
d Y

. 
 So, Term 2 = - 1 1 2
ln
p pk k
pk
y e k p
xx
Y E
CI CI CI CI
Y

  
    
 
 
       
 
 

. Solving, 
we get: Term 2 = - 1 CI
Y


 .  Thus, equation (a) becomes: 1 y
dCI
CI CI
dY Y


     -- (b). Since,
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1d
dY Y

 , equation (b) becomes: 
y y
y
CI CI CI CIdCI Y d
dY dY Y Y



    
     
   
 -- (c) which is the 
equation (21) of the text. 
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This dissertation identifies the sustainable policies that can reduce disparity in health care 
utilization, education and income from the low and middle income countries represented by 
Albania, Nepal, Tajikistan and Tanzania. Concentration indices are used to calculate the income 
related inequality in health care utilization and education, and Gini index is used to calculate the 
inequality in income. Likewise, a horizontal inequity index is used to test whether the principle 
of equal treatment for equal need and equal schooling for equal need is maintained in all 
countries under study. Finally, a mechanism is proposed to quantify the effect of policy change 
on disparity. Then this tool is used to quantify the effect of policy change on disparity in health 
care utilization, education and income.  
Major findings of this dissertation are: (1) Statistically significant inequality exists in all 
countries under study and the principle for equal treatment for equal need and equal schooling 
for equal need are also not fulfilled. (2)  Vicious vs. virtuous circle of disparity exist among 
health care utilization, education and income. For example, an increase in education and income 
may not always decrease income related inequality in health care utilization. However, if those 
increases respectively decrease the inequality in education and income first then that could 
108 
 
 
automatically decrease inequality in health care utilization. This fact is equally applicable for the 
reduction of inequality in education and income. If the changes in policy variable increase the 
disparity in the same variable that could lead to the vicious circle of disparity among three 
whereas if that changes reduces disparity in the same variable that could leads to the virtuous 
circle of disparity among three. (3) Thus, integrated approach of development is sustainable and 
scalable than single sectoral development policy to eliminate disparity from low and middle 
income countries represented by Albania, Nepal, Tajikistan and Tanzania. 
 
Keywords: Income related inequality, horizontal in(equity), concentration index, policy effect of 
disparity, bootstrapping, Africa, Asia and Eastern Europe; Nepal. 
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